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Causal effects of a policy change on hazard rates of a duration outcome variable
are not identified from a comparison of spells before and after the policy change
if there is unobserved heterogeneity in the effects and no model structure is im-
posed. We develop a discontinuity approach that overcomes this by considering
spells that include the moment of the policy change and by exploiting variation
in the moment at which different cohorts are exposed to the policy change. We
prove identification of average treatment effects on hazard rates without model
structure. We estimate these effects by kernel hazard regression. We use the in-
troduction of the NDYP program for young unemployed individuals in the UK to
estimate average program participation effects on the exit rate to work as well as
anticipation effects.
Keywords. Policy evaluation, hazard rate, identification, causality, regression dis-
continuity, selectivity, kernel hazard estimation, local linear regression, average
treatment effect, job search assistance, youth unemployment.
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1. Introduction
Most important life events and choices have dynamic consequences and are partly mo-
tivated by dynamic considerations. For instance, jobseekers may find it increasingly
hard to move into work the longer they remain unemployed. Such patterns permeate
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into public policies and call for time-dependencies in successful interventions. In other
words, the design of dynamic policies depends crucially on understanding when to in-
tervene. To return to the example of the unemployed, should a job-search assistance
or other active labor market program target the newly unemployed, or should it focus
on those who failed to find a job without support? Despite its relevance, empirical re-
searchers have struggled to uncover measures of policy impact that inform the dynamic
design of policies when the object of interest is a duration variable (e.g., unemployment
or employment duration, the duration until recovery from a disease) or, more specifi-
cally, its hazard rate. To deal with the possibility that policy exposure affects the distribu-
tion of unobserved characteristics conditional on survival, inference on hazard rates tra-
ditionally relies on rather strong assumptions. Most prominently, it is assumed that the
duration dependence effect and the effects of the observed and unobserved explanatory
variables on the individual hazard rate are proportional. In addition, independence be-
tween observed and unobserved individual characteristics is assumed (see, e.g., Meyer
(1996) and Abbring and van den Berg (2005)).1
In this paper we show how to fruitfully use policy regime changes or discontinuities
to identify and estimate the impact of treatments on duration outcomes without invok-
ing parametric or semi-parametric assumptions. Our object of interest is the average
effect of exposure to a policy at some duration t0 on the probability of leaving a given
state either instantaneously, that is, on the hazard rate, or on the conditional survival
probability over some period [t0 t1).
The tradition in the empirical regression-discontinuity literature applied to duration
outcomes is to compare spells starting after the reform (treated) with those starting be-
fore the reform (controls), where the latter are right-censored at the time of the reform.
We show that such practice cannot avoid the methodological problems of hazard rate
analysis discussed above and, in addition, at any post-reform moment, can only be in-
formative about effects on durations shorter than the time since the reform. The latter
is both inconvenient and makes it increasingly likely that the post-reform outcomes are
affected by other post-reform events.
Our strategy deals with these issues by exploiting spells that are ongoing at the time
of the reform. Specifically, we prove identification of an average causal treatment ef-
fect on the hazard rate of the duration distribution in the presence of unobserved het-
erogeneity, in a fully non-parametric setting without imposing a (mixed) proportional
hazard model structure and without making a “random effects” assumption (i.e., with-
out imposing independence of observed explanatory variables from unobserved hetero-
geneity). We obtain similar results for effects on conditional survival probabilities.
The basic insight stems from recognizing that the policy change is an exogenous
time-varying binary explanatory variable whose discontinuity point varies indepen-
dently across spells that started before the time of the reform. By comparing survivors
who share a given elapsed duration t0 at the moment of the reform to survivors at the
same elapsed duration t0 in an earlier cohort, we effectively compare two cohorts where
the weeding out of individuals with favorable unobserved characteristics up to t0 is iden-
tical because neither cohort was exposed to the new policy up to t0. That is, the dynamic
1We discuss these issues in detail in Section 3.2 of this paper.
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selection is the same up to t0. This means that a cross-cohort comparison of outcomes
conditional on survival up to t0 identifies average causal effects and is not contaminated
by selection effects.
Our identification results naturally suggest an empirical implementation. When the
outcome of interest is the hazard rate, the inputs for the policy evaluation are provided
by estimates of observed hazard rates, i.e., hazard rates as a function of the elapsed dura-
tion and observed covariates. In general, such observed hazard rates are selective aver-
ages of individual hazard rates; in the paper we show how to carefully combine different
observed hazard rates to obtain the average causal effect of interest.
These results are novel and general: our analysis demonstrates that the observed
hazards are informative about average policy effects on individual hazard rates, in the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity and without model structure. They also carry the
perhaps counterintuitive insight that models exploiting policy changes as a time varying
covariate may produce valid estimates of the average policy effect even if incorrectly as-
suming away unobserved heterogeneity (and hence imposing homogeneous treatment
effects).2
This paper connects to a number of branches of the evaluation literature. The first of
these is the literature on “regression discontinuity” methods for policy evaluation (see,
for example Hahn, Todd, and van der Klaauw (2001), Porter (2003), and Frölich (2007),
for econometric contributions in non-parametric settings). Here, a nuanced difference
results from our strategy of combining data from different cohorts to estimate treated
and counterfactual hazard rates. It implies that we can drop the typical regression dis-
continuity assumption of continuity of the hazard rate in the absence of treatment at
the duration of interest. This feature is particularly important in applications involving
estimates of treatment effects at various durations, as continuity of the hazard function
cannot generally be taken for granted everywhere. If continuity holds, our alternative
before-after comparison around the policy discontinuity point can also be applied.
This paper also relates to the literature on treatment evaluation using “dynamic
matching”. The latter is a set of techniques for situations where treatment assignment
can occur at different possible elapsed durations in the state of interest. In particular,
it considers survivors at some elapsed duration t0 and, amongst them, compares the
treated at t0 to the not-yet-treated at t0, assuming that the treatment status of the sur-
vivors at t0 is conditionally independent of the potential outcomes after t0, conditional
on a set of covariates X (i.e., by invoking a CIA assumption). Part of this literature takes
into account that the not-yet-treated at t0 may be treated later, but in general it is silent
on the dynamic selection before t0. Vikström (2017) gives an overview of matching esti-
mators for average effects of a treatment at t0 on the conditional survival distribution on
(t0∞) and proposes an inverse-probability weighting matching estimator. The match-
ing estimator is similar to our estimator for average effects on conditional survival prob-
abilities. However, our analysis provides a foundation for the CIA, by relating it to events
in the duration interval from zero up to t0. The analysis carries an important caveat for
the application of dynamic matching estimators, namely that the CIA is unlikely to be
2These implications as well as empirical examples where they are relevant are discussed in Section 4.2.
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satisfied if the treatment and comparison groups have had systematically different event
histories between entering the state of interest (say, entry into unemployment) and the
moment of treatment t0, even if they have the same personal characteristics and the
same labor market history before entry.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of the policy rel-
evance of our approach. Section 3 introduces the notation and discusses the parameters
of interest, assumptions and identification results. Section 4 discusses non-parametric
estimators of average causal effects on the hazard rates. These are based on the Müller
and Wang (1994) boundary kernel hazard estimation method with data-adaptive local
bandwidths, and on local linear kernel smoothing along the lines of Wang (2005). We
also discuss inference of effects on conditional survival probabilities. In each case, the
empirical setting typically allows for a choice between a range of cohorts that may serve
as the comparison group of non-treated. We develop a “matching” procedure to select
the most appropriate cohort. In Section 5 we apply our methodology to look at the im-
pact of the New Deal for Young People (NDYP)—an active labor market policy designed
to help the young unemployed getting back to work—on duration outcomes. In addition
to providing effects of the job search assistance treatment, the application allows us to
evaluate the effect of the policy announcement on unemployed individuals before they
receive job search assistance. Effectively, our method enables inference on the anticipa-
tion of future job search assistance. Section 6 concludes.
2. Policy relevance and applications
This section discusses the general policy relevance of our approach. We describe a range
of settings where the approach can be fruitfully applied, and we discuss the plausibility
of the underlying assumptions.
A prototype setting is that of a reform in active labor market policies targeting ex-
isting and future unemployed. The NDYP reform that we study in Section 5 is one such
reform. It provided job-search assistance and a menu of other treatments to the young
unemployed. On the reform date, eligibility was limited to those whose elapsed unem-
ployment duration reached an integer multiple of 6 months, and participation was com-
pulsory in this group (details in Section 5). The reform may affect those enrolling in the
program at elapsed durations of 61218    months at the time of the reform, but also
those as yet ineligible who foresee gaining eligibility in the future; the latter may change
their behavior in an attempt to influence the likelihood of reaching the moment they
can enroll.
In this setting, our method can be used to estimate various causal effects of en-
rollment in the NDYP using the first group to be treated—i.e., young unemployed for
6 months, or multiples of 6 months, at the time of the reform. Specifically, we can esti-
mate the instantaneous average effects on the exit rates from unemployment and the
average effects on the probability of exiting unemployment over some time interval af-
ter enrollment, both by elapsed unemployment duration.3 These are policy-relevant pa-
rameters because they provide information about how the impact of treatment changes
3The compulsory nature of the NDYP supports the identification of average treatment effects.
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with the elapsed duration at the time of the treatment for the specific population of sur-
vivors at each duration; in particular they can support the policy decision of when to
provide treatment. Our method can also be used to estimate the average effect of the
reform on those at risk of future treatment, by focusing on the unemployed at elapsed
durations other than multiples of 6 months at the time of the reform—the effect of the
anticipation of a future treatment by those who learn at the reform date about the tim-
ing of the future treatment. This is relevant for researchers considering the feasibility of
using spells that become treated some time after the reform—estimation of treatment
effects using such spells is likely to be confounded by selection bias due to anticipation,
regardless of the mandatory nature of the treatment.
There is a myriad of other relevant policy contexts where our approach can bring
important insights. One is that of designing and evaluating a dynamic unemployment
insurance. Recent literature has addressed the questions of whether eligibility to unem-
ployment benefits should be time-limited or whether entitlement should change with
unemployment duration.4 Reforms to the time schedule of the unemployment benefits
are salient to those on benefits, who are likely to respond quickly. With such a reform
(as in Lalive (2008)) our method is well suited to provide fast and reliable information
about its effects. Similarly, our approach can be used to assess the effect of pensions on
time to retirement, the effect of maternity benefits on parental leave, or the impact of
re-employment subsidies on unemployment durations.
Without going into details until the next section, it is clear that our approach re-
quires a number of assumptions to hold true. Most of these are common in dynamic
evaluation settings. First, we require a conditional independence assumption (CIA). To
explain the CIA we adopt, note that we allow for systematic unobserved heterogeneity
across subjects, which affect the individual potential-outcome hazard rates at all dura-
tions. The observed and systematic unobserved determinants do not capture all random
variation in potential outcomes, by virtue of additional idiosyncratic random shocks.
This setting is common in econometric duration models (see e.g. Lancaster (1990), van
den Berg (2001), Abbring and van den Berg (2003), and Abbring and Heckman (2007),
for discussions). The CIA assumes independence between treatment assignment and
potential outcomes conditional on both the observed and the systematic unobserved
determinants. This CIA is weaker than usually encountered in the evaluation literature,
as it does not imply a CIA conditional on the observed covariates only.
As a second key assumption, we require absence of anticipation of theevent that we
aim to evaluate, where the event can be a treatment or the introduction of a new policy
or a restructuring of an old program, or alternatively the arrival of new information re-
garding a policy or a future treatment. In the latter case the arrival of information must
be observable to the researcher. Absence of anticipation of the event is violated if agents
receive private advance information about the date of onset of the event, for example
from caseworkers to unemployed workers, as this may induce the workers to intensify
their job search, causing them to leave unemployment before the event takes place. To
avoid confusion, note that if we aim to evaluate the effect of the arrival of information
then the moment of the information arrival should not be anticipated.
4See e.g., Kolsrud, Landais, Nilsson, and Spinnewijn (2018) and Stantcheva (2017).
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Finally, in our baseline approach, we require that the treated and control cohorts at
their respective moment of entry into the state of interest have an identical composition
in terms of unobserved characteristics conditional on observed covariates. In our NDYP
illustration, based on a comparison between two cohorts, this means that the composi-
tion at entry into unemployment must be the same for the cohort that is treated at a cer-
tain elapsed duration t0 as for a cohort that entered unemployment earlier and hence is
exposed to the treatment at an elapsed duration exceeding t0. In general, the assumption
requires careful consideration, since business cycles, seasonality and institutional fea-
tures may cause systematic variation across cohorts. Observed covariates may control
for major differences. Also, it may sometimes be argued that cohorts that entered, say,
unemployment in close succession do not have a substantially different composition in
terms of unobservables. Examples of unobservables that are relevant for effects on un-
employment exit rates include personality traits and non-cognitive abilities, especially if
register data are used (as in our NDYP analysis). Now consider two cohorts of displaced
workers entering unemployment in close succession, after mass layoffs or some other
shock in the market. At the individual level it can be more or less random whether the
individual belongs to the first cohort or to the second, as this is driven by administrative
dealings of the employer and the employment office. Each cohort is dispersed in terms
of an unobserved personality trait, say neuroticism, conditional on observed covariates.
The cohort composition in terms of this personality trait is then identical across cohorts.
In practice one has the choice between a range of potential control cohorts. In Sec-
tion 4, we develop a procedure to discard those potential control cohorts that have dif-
ferent compositions in terms of unobservables. The latter include cohorts with different
season- or cycle-specific compositions.
A characteristic feature of our methodology is its focus on the immediate or short-
run effects of a policy reform. To avoid misunderstandings, note that the methodology
does not necessarily restrict the evaluation horizon to very brief interventions or very
short durations, as it also allows for assessing the impact of a policy on conditional sur-
vival rates.5
3. Duration distributions, policy changes, and identification
3.1 Notation and assumptions
We consider a population of agents or individuals flowing into a state of interest, and we
are interested in the durations that these individuals subsequently spend in that state.
In particular, we are interested in the causal effect of a single “treatment” that is either
assigned to commence at some time s ∈ R+ := [0∞) after entering the state or is not
5If the treatment only takes place after a certain time in the state of interest, then, depending on the
specific design of the policy, even control cohorts that enter the state of interest closely after the exposed
cohort may offer scope for medium-span comparisons. For instance, eligibility to the NDYP is restricted up
to 6 months after the reform for the cohorts completing a 6-month duration in unemployment just before
the reform. The earlier part of this period, over which it may be safe to rule out anticipation given that
treatment is in the far horizon, can be used to extend the evaluation horizon.
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assigned at all. We can cast this in the standard potential outcome framework by rec-
ognizing that the dynamically assigned binary treatment can be reinterpreted as a set
of mutually exclusive treatments indexed by R+ ∪ {∞} which we denote by A. Here, the
point ∞ represents the no-treatment case. To each treatment s ∈A corresponds a ran-
dom variable T(s) ≥ 0, the potential outcome duration in the case that we would inter-
vene and assign treatment s. For ease of exposition, we assume that each T(s) for given
s is a random variable that is continuously distributed.
The treatment at the elapsed duration s can be interpreted as representing the expo-
sure to a reform occurring at the individual elapsed duration s. In the stock of individu-
als in the state of interest at the moment of the policy reform, the elapsed duration from
the moment of inflow until the moment of exposure to the reform will be dispersed. We
therefore do not restrict the number of elements inA at this stage.
Causal inference is concerned with contrasting potential outcomes corresponding
to different treatments. Specifically, we are interested in differences between the distri-
butions of T(s) and T(s′) corresponding to treatments s s′ ∈ A. These differences are
called treatment effects. In social sciences, the exit rate or hazard rate of a duration dis-
tribution is the most interesting feature of this distribution, as it is directly related to the
agent’s behavior and his information set and circumstances conditional on survival into
the state of interest (see van den Berg (2001)).6 Therefore, we focus on average effects of
the treatments on the individual exit rate out of the state of interest and the individual
conditional exit probabilities out of this state.
For arbitrary s, let the distribution function of T(s) be denoted by FT(s). This is a
function of the time t since inflow into the state of interest. The corresponding “in-
tegrated hazard” ΘT(s)(t) is defined by ΘT(s)(t) := − log(1 − FT(s)(t)). We assume that
ΘT(s)(t) has a continuous first-derivative on (0∞) except for a finite number of points
where it is right continuous. The hazard rate of T(s) denoted by θT(s) can then be for-
mally introduced as the right derivative of the integrated hazard with respect to t. We
assume that the hazard rates satisfy regularity conditions that guarantee existence of all
expressions below.
The individual treatment effect of interest is
θT(s′)(t)− θT(s)(t) (1)
for t ≥ 0 and for s′ s ∈A. This is the additive effect on the hazard rate at t of replacing one
treatment s by another treatment s′, as a function of t. In the case of a policy reform, this
is the additive effect on the hazard rate at t of exposure to the reform at elapsed duration
s′ instead of at the elapsed duration s.
In addition, we consider the treatment effect on the probability of surviving up to t
conditional on survival up to t0,
1− FT(s′)(t)
1− FT(s′)(t0) −
1− FT(s)(t)
1− FT(s)(t0) (2)
6With T continuous, the hazard rate at elapsed duration t is defined as θ(t) = limdt↓0 Pr(T ∈ [t t + dt)|
T ≥ t)/dt.
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for t ≥ t0 ≥ 0 and s′ s ∈A. At t0 = 0, this captures the effect on the unconditional survival
function. We also consider the multiplicative or relative treatment effect on the hazard
rate at t,
θT(s′)(t)
θT(s)(t)
(3)
for all t ≥ 0 and s′ s ∈A.
Treatments are assigned according to a random variable S with support A. The ac-
tual outcome is T := T(S); all other potential outcomes are counterfactual. Here, we
may simply take S to denote the elapsed duration at the moment at which the agent is
exposed to the reform.
We allow agents to be ex ante heterogeneous in terms of observed characteristics
X and unobserved characteristics V . The latter are systematic in that they may affect
the individual potential-outcome hazard rates at all durations. Both X and V may be
exogenously time-varying, but for ease of exposition we abstract from this. For the same
reason, we take V to be a continuous random variable.
As noted in Section 2, we take it that X and V do not capture all random variation in
potential outcomes. This means that the distributions of T(s)|XV are nondegenerate,
which in turn allows us to define corresponding hazard rates conditional on X and V .
The difference between the distributions and individual drawings from it represent id-
iosyncratic shocks and capture residual unexplained variation in individual potential-
outcome durations. Their distribution is independent of all other model determinants.
See van den Berg (2001), Abbring and van den Berg (2003), and Abbring and Heckman
(2007) for a detailed discussion.
The hazard rate, integrated hazard, and the distribution function of T(s) can be de-
fined for individuals with given characteristics (XV ). We denote these by θT(s)(t|XV ),
ΘT(s)(t|XV ), and FT(s)(t|XV ), respectively.7 The survival function is FT(s)(t|XV ) =
1−FT(s)(t|XV ). The individual treatment effects defined above can be defined accord-
ingly as functions of X and V .
Inference is based on a random sample of agents from the population. For each of
these, we observe the duration outcome T and the observed covariates X . If the treat-
ment S captures the exposure to a policy reform, then S is effectively observable to the
researcher for all agents (but not always to the agents themselves; see Assumption 2 be-
low). We allow for random right censoring of T .8
We assume that treatment assignment is randomized conditional on covariates X ,
V , and also that treatment assignment is independent of V given X ,
Assumption 1 (Assignment). S⊥ {T(s)}|(XV ) and S⊥ V |X .
7Thus, θT(s)(t|XV ) denotes the hazard of T(s)|XV . Arguably, the most accurate notation for this would
be θT(s)|XV (t) as it uses the subscript to refer to the random variable of the hazard rate considered. To
facilitate readability, we adopt the former option. This also applies to Θ and F .
8This is usually referred to as “simple random right-censoring.” Extensions to more general forms of
independent censoring and filtering are straightforward (see Andersen, Borgan, Gill, and Keiding (1993)
and Fleming and Harrington (1991)).
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The first part of this assumption resembles the familiar conditional independence
assumption (CIA) in the evaluation literature, albeit that it conditions not only on co-
variates X but also on unobserved characteristics V . This allows for endogenous selec-
tion into the treatment, but in the context sketched in Section 2, with a universal reform,
it is more relevant that it allows for entry cohorts to be systematically different in terms
of the distribution of (XV ). To see this, note that different cohorts (flowing into the
state of interest at different points of time) correspond to different values of S. Next, the
second part of Assumption 1 states that different cohorts have identical compositions of
V |X . In Section 2 we discussed an example of an unobservable V inspired by our NDYP
application (a personality trait that is unobserved in register data) that plausibly satisfies
this.910
Notice that the two parts of Assumption 1 taken together imply that S⊥ {T(s)}|X .
The latter is the usual CIA that is assumed from the outset in the dynamic matching
literature (see e.g. Crépon, Ferracci, Jolivet, and van den Berg (2009)). Therefore, our As-
sumption 1 is stronger than this usual CIA. However, note that we aim to evaluate effects
not upon entry but conditional on survival up to the moment at which an envisaged
treatment takes place. What is required for this is that treatment and control cohorts
can be meaningfully compared at the very moment at which the treatment takes place.
In the presence of unobserved characteristics, their incorporation as model determi-
nants enables us to provide a foundation for a CIA that holds at that very moment at
which the treatment takes place. As we shall see in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, this requires the
assessment of dynamic selection in the duration interval from the moment of entry up
to the moment of treatment. Assumption 1 is therefore instrumental in discussing the
extent to which the composition of different cohorts at t is identical in terms of unob-
served individual characteristics. In particular, the plausibility of the usual CIA can be
assessed by focusing on the role of events in-between entry and exposure. As we discuss
in Section 4.2 below, this can in turn be used empirically to provide guidance on how to
choose an appropriate control group for the evaluation.
Throughout much of the paper, we assume that there is no anticipation by agents
of the reform or event that we aim to evaluate. With this we mean that, before a reform
takes place, agents’ behavior does not depend on the time remaining until the future
reform. We formalize this by assuming that current integrated potential hazards do not
depend on the moment of future treatment exposure,
Assumption 2 (No Anticipation). For all s ∈ (0∞) and for all t ≤ s and all X , V ,
ΘT(s)(t|XV )=ΘT(∞)(t|XV )
9Another example concerns cohorts entering unemployment in close succession that were exposed to a
randomized intervention just before leaving employment. The intervention could be an information treat-
ment provided to, say, 5% of each cohort, where the information is about the use of job search methods.
This randomization probability may even be stratified based on a vector of covariates X . The treatment
status may be unobserved to the researcher. We may then define V as the information treatment exposure.
The cohort composition in terms of V is then identical across cohorts, i.e., the second part of Assumption 1
is satisfied. A randomized experiment in which S itself is an instantaneous binary treatment (i.e.A= {0∞})
also satisfies Assumption 1.
10As shown in Abbring and van den Berg (2003, 2005), settings in which the assumption of S⊥ V |X is
relaxed require a semiparametric model framework in order to be able to point-identify objects of interest.
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(See Abbring and van den Berg (2003), for a detailed discussion.) Here, ΘT(∞) is the
integrated hazard of the potential duration corresponding to never enrolling in treat-
ment. As explained in Section 2, if the moment of the arrival of information about a
future treatment or reform is observable to the researcher then one may evaluate the
effect of the information arrival (and hence the effect of anticipation of the future treat-
ment or reform) itself. In that case the moment of the information arrival should not be
anticipated. Section 5 contains an empirical illustration of this.
3.2 Spells from the steady states before and after a policy change
In this subsection we consider empirical inference if the data collection leads to two
samples: one in which Pr(S = 0) = 1 and one in which Pr(S = ∞) = 1. In the context of
policy reform evaluation, these samples originate from two subpopulations. One sam-
ple is drawn from the inflow into the state of interest after the reform and thus satisfies
Pr(S = 0)= 1. Notice that this assumes that the reform is universal. The other sample is
drawn from the inflow before the reform. Using the notation S = ∞ for the latter sample
requires some explanation. Even if the inflow occurred a long time before the reform,
some spells may not be completed at the reform date. This means that in fact the indi-
vidual is exposed to the reform at a finite elapsed duration. However, in that case, the
spell durations are artificially right-censored at the reform date. Under our model as-
sumptions, these pre-reform durations have the same distribution as in a world without
the reform.11 Therefore the notation S = ∞ can be used for them. Figure 1 depicts this
setting in a Lexis diagram, where τ denotes calendar time and τ∗ denotes the moment at
which the reform is implemented. Each diagonal line represents a single cohort. Univer-
sality of the reform means that all spells starting after τ∗ are exposed to the new policy.
The main purpose of the present subsection is to demonstrate that this sampling
scheme has limited value for inference on the causal effects of interest. Furthermore,
the subsection motivates the study of an alternative sampling scheme and inferential
approach in the subsequent subsection.
Note that in the current dichotomous setting, S is observable by the agent from the
onset, and Assumption 2 is void. Assumption 1 implies that the treatment assignment
upon inflow into the state of interest is not selective, conditional on X . In particular, the
distribution of characteristics V |X at inflow is the same in each policy regime or at least
in the relevant inflow cohorts used before and after the reform.
As in most evaluation literature, we study inference on averages of individual treat-
ment effects as that expressed in expression (1). We thus need to average
θT(0)(t|XV )− θT(∞)(t|XV )
over the distribution of V |X in the relevant subpopulation.
11Alternatively, one may think of the sample with Pr(S = 0) = 1 as a sample of fully treated agents and
the other sample as a sample of controls. Provided that no ambiguity arises, we use the terms “pre-reform
policy”, “pre-policy”, and “control” interchangeably. The same applies to “post-reform policy”, “post-policy”
and “treatment”, and the same also applies to “moment of the policy change” “reform” and “introduction
of the policy”. A more explicit discussion is provided in Section 4.2.
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Figure 1. Lexis diagram: “Before” sample and “after” sample based on cohorts flowing into the
state of interest before or after the policy reform, respectively.
The dynamic selection of survivors imposes particular challenges in defining the rel-
evant subpopulations over which to aggregate. As is well known, the distribution of V |X
among survivors typically differs from the population distribution of V |X . Individuals
with values of V that give rise to high hazard rates at durations below t are underrep-
resented among the survivors at t. This implies, first of all, that it is not informative to
average over the distribution of V |X in the full population, since in either policy regime
the subpopulation of survivors at the elapsed duration t is systematically different from
the full population.
Moreover, as indicated by Meyer (1996), if the treatment has a causal effect on the
duration, then, typically, the distribution of V |X among the survivors at points in time
t > 0 depends on the treatment, so V ⊥ S|XT > t. Thus, the independence between V
and S among those with T ≥ t|X for some t > 0 is lost despite the independence at t = 0,
that is, despite V ⊥ S|XT ≥ 0. To illustrate this, let f , F , Θ, and F be generic symbols
for a density, a distribution function, an integrated hazard, and a survivor function, with
subscripts denoting the corresponding random variable (note that F = 1− F = e−Θ). By
Bayes’ rule, there holds that
fV (v|XT > tS)= FT (t|XSV )fV (v|X)∫ ∞
0
FT (t|XSV )dFV (v|X)
 (4)
which typically varies with S.12
12It is not difficult to construct examples in which the distribution of V |X among the treated survivors
at t is first-order stochastically dominated by the distribution of V |X among the nontreated survivors
at t, if there is a strong positive interaction between being treated and V in the individual hazard rates
θT(s)(t|XV ) and if these hazard rates increase in V and in being treated (see van den Berg (2001)). In such
scenarios, the individual hazard rate at t is disproportionally large if both S = 0 and V is large, and as a
result the treated survivors at t may contain relatively few treated individuals with a high value of V .
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Thus, contrasting the two subpopulations defined by conditioning on the observed
(T ≥ tXS)does not lead to meaningful average treatment effects, because the subpop-
ulations have systematically different compositions of unobserved characteristics V . To
proceed, we consider alternative concepts of average treatment effects. These measures
average over subpopulations of individuals for whom one or more counterfactual dura-
tion outcomes exceed t. This follows Abbring and van den Berg (2005). Specifically, we
consider
E
[
θT(0)(t|XV )− θT(∞)(t|XV )|XT(0)≥ t
]

E
[
θT(0)(t|XV )− θT(∞)(t|XV )|XT(0)≥ tT (∞)≥ t
]

E
[
θT(0)(t|XV )− θT(∞)(t|XV )|XT(∞)≥ t
]

which can be called the Average Treatment effect on the Treated Survivors at t
(ATTS(t|X)), the Average Treatment effect on the Survivors at t (ATS(t|X)), and the Aver-
age Treatment effect on the Nontreated Survivors at t (ATNTS(t|X)). ATTS(t|X) averages
over the distribution of V |X among the survivors at t if the agents are assigned to the
“treatment” (i.e., are assigned to s = 0, or, in other words, are exposed to the policy in-
troduced by the reform). Under randomization, this is equivalent to averaging over the
distribution of V among the treated survivors at t (so with X , T ≥ t, S = 0). ATNTS(t|X)
is the counterpart of this for assignment to the control group. ATS(t|X) averages over
the distribution of V |X among individuals who survive up to t under both possible treat-
ment regimes. These measures can subsequently be aggregated over some distribution
of X . Analogous additive and multiplicative effects can be defined for the conditional
survival probabilities and the hazard rate, respectively (recall equations (2) and (3)).13
Note that in general all measures are properties of subpopulations whose composition
depends on the treatment effect in the duration interval [0 t).
The above average effects cannot be estimated nonparametrically from the data
design of the present subsection. Nonparametric inference produces sample equiva-
lents of θT (t|XS = 0) and θT (t|XS = ∞) and of FT (t|XS = 0)/FT (t0|XS = 0) and
FT (t|XS = ∞)/FT (t0|XS = ∞). For given t, s, X , individual and observable hazard
rates are connected by the following relation (see e.g. Lancaster (1990, page 63 ff.) and
also Andersen et al. (1993, page 667 ff.), which restricts attention to gamma distributions
for V ),
θT (t|XS = s) = E
(
θT (t|XS = sV )|XT ≥ t S = s
)
 (5)
Therefore,
θT (t|XS = 0)− θT (t|XS = ∞)
≡ E[θT (t|XS = 0 V )|XT ≥ t S = 0]−E[θT (t|XS = ∞ V )|XT ≥ t S = ∞]
13The ATS(t|X) version for the multiplicative effect on the hazard rate essentially equals the survivor
average causal effect of Rubin (2000) in case the latter measure is applied to the duration outcome itself
rather than to nonduration outcomes.
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= E[θT (t|XS = 0 V )|XT ≥ t S = 0]−E[θT (t|XS = ∞ V )|XT ≥ t S = 0]
+E[θT (t|XS = ∞ V )|XT ≥ t S = 0]−E[θT (t|XS = ∞ V )|XT ≥ t S = ∞]
which is the sum of two differences. The first difference is the average treatment ef-
fect ATTS(t|X) (for sake of brevity, we refer to the next subsection for the proof of
this statement). The second difference is the selection effect due to the fact that at
T = t, among the survivors at t, those exposed to the post-reform policy and those not
exposed have systematically different unobserved characteristics despite the random-
ization of the regime status at t = 0. Since the second term on the right-hand side is
unobserved, we conclude that the left-hand side cannot be used to nonparametrically
estimate ATTS(t|X).14
The results are straightforwardly extended to more general sets of possible treat-
ments as long as we only use data on spells within which the treatment status does not
change. To identify average treatment effects in the setting of the current subsection,
one needs to adopt a semiparametric model structure like an MPH model, or one needs
to assume absence of unobserved heterogeneity.
Admittedly, if interest is in the average additive treatment effect on theunconditional
survival probability at t, i.e. E[FT(0)(t|XV ) − FT(∞)(t|XV )] then the above concerns
are less relevant. The latter average effect is identified under a randomization as-
sumption such as Assumption 1, from the observed expression Pr(T > t|XS = 0) −
Pr(T > t|XS = ∞). Inference on the two survivor functions in this expression is
straightforward; see e.g. Andersen et al. (1993).
3.3 Spells that are ongoing at the moment of the policy change
In this subsection, we consider empirical inference if the data collection is based on ran-
dom samples from cohorts flowing into the state of interest before the introduction of
a universal policy at τ∗.15 Contrary to the previous subsection, we track duration out-
comes in these cohorts beyond τ∗. Figure 2 depicts this setting. As in Figure 1, each di-
agonal line represents a single entry cohort.
We assume that the post-reform policy regime applies to all agents, from calendar
time τ∗ onwards, including to those who enter the state of interest before τ∗. Inflow at
time τ0 ≤ τ∗ leads to S := τ∗ − τ0. Thus, there is a one-to-one correspondence between
the moment of inflow and the duration at which the treatment starts. However, in this
setting, S is not observed by the agent until calendar time τ∗, as there is no anticipa-
tion of the introduction of the new policy program (Assumption 2). We rule out that the
distributions of T(s)|(XV ) are discontinuous at T(s) = s (though of course the hazard
rates may be discontinuous there).
14By analogy to the remarks on equation (4), one can construct examples where θT (t|XS = 0) <
θT (t|XS = ∞) even if θT(0)(t|XV ) > θT(∞)(t|XV ) almost surely for all (t V X).
15“Universal” here means that the new policy regime is compulsory for all individuals currently in the
state of interest at τ∗ or entering the state of interest after τ∗. We use the terms “universal” and “compulsory”
interchangeably with the term “comprehensive.”
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Figure 2. Lexis diagram: “before” sample based on cohorts flowing into the state of of interest
before the policy reform, including spells that are ongoing at the moment of the policy change
and that are followed beyond that moment.
Assumption 1 again implies that the treatment assignment upon inflow into the state
of interest is not selective, conditional on X . In fact, as we shall see, we only require
Assumption 1 for the cohorts flowing in before τ∗. The assumption’s implication that the
distribution of characteristics V |X at inflow is constant over calendar time is therefore
only required for inflow dates before τ∗. This is attractive because the effect of a policy
reform on the decision to enter the state of interest may vary with unobserved individual
characteristics.
Comparing agents who flow out before τ∗ to those who flow in after τ∗ is hampered
by the same problems as in the previous subsection. However, we can now also examine
the effect at duration τ∗ − τ0 of a treatment that starts at duration S, as compared to the
case where at duration τ∗ − τ0 no treatment is assigned yet. To this purpose, we may
define the average additive treatment effects on hazard rates at durations t by analogy
to those in the previous subsection, contrasting treatment assignment at time s′ with
treatment assignment at time s > s′. In particular,
ATTS
(
s′ s t|X) := E[θT(s′)(t|XV )− θT(s)(t|XV )|XT (s′)≥ t] with s′ ≤ t s;
ATNTS
(
s′ s t|X) := E[θT(s′)(t|XV )− θT(s)(t|XV )|XT(s)≥ t] with s′ ≤ t s
The following proposition is the key to the main result of this paper.
Proposition 1. Consider a cohort flowing in at calendar time τ0 < τ∗ and a cohort
flowing in at τ1 < τ0. Let ti := τ∗ − τi. Under Assumptions 1 and 2, [V |T ≥ t0XS = t0]
and [V |T ≥ t0XS = t1] have the same distribution, namely the distribution of
[V |T(s)≥ t0X] with s ≥ t0. This distribution does not vary with s for all s ≥ t0.
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Proof. Note that τ1 < τ0 implies that t0 < t1. Let Pr be a general symbol for a density as
well as a probability. By Bayes’ law, the density Pr(V |T ≥ t0XS = ti) (with i = 01) can
be written as
Pr(T ≥ t0|V XS = ti)Pr(V |XS = ti)
Pr(T ≥ t0|XS = ti)
(see e.g. Lancaster (1990)). In this expression, Pr(T ≥ t0|V XS = ti) equals Pr(T(ti) ≥
t0|V X) due to the randomized assignment assumption (Assumption 1: S⊥ {T(s)}|
(XV )). Moreover, Pr(V |XS = ti) equals Pr(V |X) due to the second part of Assump-
tion 1 (S⊥ V |X).16 This implies that the density Pr(V |T ≥ t0XS = ti) as a function of
V is proportional to Pr(T(ti) ≥ t0|V X)Pr(V |X) which is proportional to Pr(V |T(ti) ≥
t0X).
Next, we show that Pr(V |T(s) ≥ t0X) is the same for every s ≥ t0 including s = t1.
By analogy to the first part of the proof, the second part of Assumption 1 implies
that the density Pr(V |T(s) ≥ t0X) as a function of V is proportional to Pr(T(s) ≥
t0|V X)Pr(V |X). The term Pr(T(s)≥ t0|V X) can be expressed as exp(−ΘT(s)(t0|XV )).
By virtue of Assumption 2, this equals exp(−ΘT(t0)(t0|XV )) since s ≥ t0. This implies
that the density Pr(V |T(s) ≥ t0X) as a function of V is proportional to Pr(T(t0) ≥
t0|V X)Pr(V |X), where the latter is proportional to Pr(V |T(t0) ≥ t0X). Thus,
Pr(V |T(s)≥ t0X) is the same for every s ≥ t0.
The significance of this proposition is that it demonstrates that the subpopulation
of individuals who are observed to be treated at the elapsed duration t0 and the sub-
population of survivors at t0 who will be treated at a higher elapsed duration have the
same composition. In other words, V ⊥ S|(T ≥ t0XS ≥ t0). Clearly, it is crucial that the
subpopulations come from populations that are identical to each other at their moment
of entry into the state of interest. Moreover, it is crucial that individuals do not act on
the future moment of treatment, because then their hazard rates (and consequently the
dynamic selection) would already differ before t0. Under these two assumptions, the
dynamic selection between the moment of entry and the elapsed duration t0 proceeds
identically in both populations, so the resulting subpopulations at t0 have an identical
distribution of unobserved characteristics.
We now apply this to the identification of average treatment effects. This gives the
main methodological result of the paper. Recall that ti := τ∗ − τi. From a cohort flowing
in at τi < τ∗, we observe the distribution of [T |XS = ti]. This entails observation of the
conditional duration distribution of [T |T ≥ t0XS = ti] and the hazard rate θT (t0|X
S = ti) evaluated at ti = t0.
Proposition 2. Consider the introduction of a compulsory policy at a given point in
time. Suppose we have duration data from cohorts that flow into the state of inter-
est (where they may eventually be exposed to the policy) before this point of time. Un-
der Assumptions 1 and 2, the average treatment effects on the individual hazard rate
16In the setting of this subsection, the assumptions entail that the policy or treatment status is random-
ized among the stock of subjects in the state of interest, given X . See Ridder (1984) for an extensive discus-
sion and Heckman and Singer (1984) for a discussion of sampling frames.
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ATTS(t0 t1 t0|X) andATNTS(t0 t1 t0|X) are nonparametrically identified and equal the
observable θT (t0|XS = t0) − θT (t0|XS = t1) with t1 > t0. These do not depend on t1 as
long as t1 exceeds t0.
We first present the proof and then discuss the relevance of the result.
Proof.
θT (t0|XS = t0)− θT (t0|XS = t1)
= E[θT (t0|XV S = t0)|XT ≥ t0 S = t0]−E[θT (t0|XV S = t1)|XT ≥ t0 S = t1]
= E[θT(t0)(t0|XV )|XT(t0)≥ t0]−E[θT(t1)(t0|XV )|XT(t0)≥ t0]
The first equality in the above expression follows from applying equation (5) to replace
each hazard rate in the first line. By Proposition 1, the distributions over which the ex-
pectations are taken in the second line are the same for any t1 ≥ t0 and are equal to the
distribution of [V |T(s)≥ t0X]. This explains the second equality. As a result,
θT (t0|XS = t0)− θT (t0|XS = t1)
= E[θT(t0)(t0|XV )− θT(t1)(t0|XV )|XT(t0)≥ t0]
=ATTS(t0 t1 t0|X)
By substituting into the second-to-last expression that the distributions of [V |T(t0) ≥
t0X] and [V |T(t1) ≥ t0X] are identical, it also follows that ATTS(t0 t1 t0|X) equals
ATNTS(t0 t1 t0|X). Moreover, in this second-to-last expression, changing the value of
t1 does not have an effect on the value of the expression as long as t1 > t0, because of
Assumption 2.
The ATTS(t0 t1 t0|X) and ATNTS(t0 t1 t0|X) capture the instantaneous causal ef-
fect of exposure to the policy (i.e., the instantaneous causal effect of the treatment) at
elapsed durations t0, compared to when the assigned moment of exposure takes place at
a higher duration t1. It follows that these measures are identified without any functional-
form restriction on the individual hazard rates and without the need to assume inde-
pendence of the unobserved explanatory variables V from the observed covariates X .
From the above proof, it is also clear that the results extend to settings where X and/or
V are not constant over time, provided that Assumptions 1 and 2 about the assignment
process and the absence of anticipation are accordingly modified.
Figure 3 visualizes the underlying idea of the proposition. In each cohort, the dy-
namic selection between the moment of entry and the elapsed duration t0 proceeds
identically. Therefore, the resulting subpopulations at t0 have an identical distribution
of unobserved characteristics. As a result, any observed difference in the hazard rates at
the elapsed duration t0 must be a causal effect of the policy change.
Since ATTS(t0 t1 t0|X) and ATNTS(t0 t1 t0|X) are equal and do not depend on t1
as long as t1 > t0, we use the shorthand notation ATS(t0|X) to represent the average
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Figure 3. Identification based on two cohorts.
instantaneous effect of the policy reform on the survivors with elapsed duration t0 at the
moment of the reform. The effect is measured in deviation from the hazard rate among
subpopulations who attained the elapsed duration t0 strictly before the reform.
The subpopulation over which the average ATS(t0|X) is taken varies with t0. This is
because the composition of the subpopulation changes due to dynamic selection as the
elapsed duration t0 increases. As a result, without further assumptions, it is not possible
to combine the average treatment effects for different t0 in order to estimate how the
average effect on the hazard changes over time for a given (sub)population. Dynamic
matching estimators share this limitation (see Crépon et al. (2009)).
Under Assumptions 1 and 2, average treatment effects on conditional survival prob-
abilities are nonparametrically identified as well. In this case, average effects on treated
survivors are defined as follows:
ATTS
(
s′ s t|X) := E[Pr(T (s′)> t + a|T (s′)≥ tXV )
− Pr(T(s) > t + a|T(s)≥ tXV )|XT (s′)≥ t]
with s′ ≤ s and a > 0
These are identified from their empirical counterpart if t ≤ s′. For example, take
t = s′ = t0 and a = 1 and s > t0 + 1. The average effect of exposure at t0 on the proba-
bility of exiting before t0 + 1, as compared to when the exposure commences after t0 + 1,
equals the observable Pr(T > t0+1|T ≥ t0XS = t0)−Pr(T > t0+1|T ≥ t0XS = t0+2),
where instead of t0 + 2 any other number exceeding t0 + 1 can be substituted. Indeed,
the observable expression can be replaced by Pr(T > t0 + 1|T ≥ t0XS = t0) − Pr(T >
t0 + 1|T ≥ t0XS ≥ t0 + 1). Clearly, such results carry over to discrete-time settings (see
below).
In Appendix A, we consider identification of average multiplicative effects on indi-
vidual hazard rates. This requires the additional assumption that the unobserved indi-
vidual characteristics V affect all counterfactual hazard rates in the same proportional
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way. In other words, the individual multiplicative effects on the hazard at t are homoge-
neous across individuals with different V (but not necessarily across X or over time; fur-
thermore, X and V need not be independent). The identification results in the Appendix
are related to identification results for duration models with unobserved heterogeneity
and time-varying explanatory variables in Honoré (1991) and Brinch (2007).
We end this subsection with a brief discussion of the identification of other in-
teresting average treatment effects. Clearly, one cannot hope to identify a full model,
that is, the unknown functions θT(s)(t|XV ) for all s and the distribution of V |X . Now
consider average treatment effects on the individual hazard rate ATTS(s′ s t|X) and
ATNTS(s′ s t|X) if s′ is strictly smaller than t and s. In such cases, inference is subject to
the same problem as in Section 3.2: the dynamic selection between s′ and t causes the
subpopulation with S = s′ among the survivors at t to be systematically different from
the subpopulation with S = s among the survivors at t. This also implies that without
functional form assumptions we can not identify accumulation effects of a prolonged
exposure to the treatment.
4. Nonparametric estimation
4.1 Boundary kernel hazard estimation
From Section 3.3, the identification of average causal effects of the policy change on
the individual hazard rates is based on the comparison of observable hazard rates from
different entry cohorts into the state of interest. Each observable hazard rate is trivially
identified from the corresponding cohort-specific duration data. It is therefore natural
to nonparametrically estimate these hazard rates.
Specifically, we are interested in θT (t0|XS = t0) and θT (t0|XS = t1) for some t1 > t0.
In Section 4.2 below, we consider alternative estimators based on limt↑t0 θT (t|XS = t0)
and θT (t0|XS ≥ t1) for some t1 > t0. In every case, the relevant estimate concerns the
hazard at the boundary t0. There is no reason to assume a connection between the shape
of the individual hazard rate before the policy change at t0 and the shape after t0, so
estimation of the hazard rate at one side of the boundary only uses outcomes from that
particular side of the boundary. Standard nonparametric hazard estimators are heavily
biased at the boundary point. We therefore use boundary kernel hazard estimators and
local linear kernel smoothing estimators.17
In the remainder of this subsection we discuss the second-order boundary kernel
hazard estimator of Müller and Wang (1994) in some detail. We use this estimator in
the empirical analysis in Section 5. For expositional convenience, we restrict attention
to hazard estimation at t0, and we transform the truncated duration distribution T |T ≥
t0XS to the left such that our ultimate interest is in the hazard rate at the boundary
0 when evaluating it from above. Similarly, in the current subsection, we may suppress
17Most of the literature on the nonparametric estimation of hazard rates imposes smoothness conditions
on the true underlying hazard rate as a function of t and continuous explanatory variables (in our case, S
and X). In cases where smoothness is absent at a boundary of the support, the hazard rate is only evaluated
at interior points.
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S in the notation. Finally, for expositional reasons, we do not condition on observed
explanatory variables X (in the empirical analysis we subsume X into V ).
Consider a random sample of n subjects, where the duration outcomes can be inde-
pendently right-censored. Let Ti denote the minimum of the actual duration outcome
and the censoring outcome for subject i (i = 1     n). Note that this notation deviates
from the notation where T denotes the actual duration outcome of interest. Further-
more, let δi be a binary variable equalling 1 iff the actual duration outcome is realized
before the censoring outcome. Let (T(i) δ(i)) be the ordered sample with respect to the
Ti (so T(1) ≤ T(2) ≤ · · · ≤ T(n)).
We assume that the true hazard rate is twice continuously differentiable in an inter-
val A starting at 0. To explain the kernel estimator, consider first the case in which the
bandwidth b is global. We distinguish between the boundary region B = {t : 0 ≤ t < b}
and an interior region I which is adjacent to B (we need not discuss the right bound-
ary of A here). In I, the kernel hazard estimator is the standard Ramlau–Hansen kernel
hazard estimator,18
θ˜(t) = 1
b
n∑
i=1
K
(
t − T(i)
b
)
δ(i)
n− i+ 1 
where K is taken to be the Epanechnikov kernel,
K(z) = 3
4
(
1− z2) for |z| ≤ 1 (6)
and K(z) = 0 elsewhere, and where b is understood to decrease with n, as explained
below.
In B, the above estimator needs to be modified to take account of the bias at the
boundary. After all, with the above estimator, it is typically of asymptotic order O(b). In
B, the kernel function K is taken to depend on the distance to the left boundary 0, so
then K has two arguments, say q and z, where q is the relative distance t/b to the left
boundary, and z, as above, attains values (t − T(i))/b. Specifically,
K(qz)= 12
(1+ q)4 (z + 1)
[
z(1− 2q)+ (3q2 − 2q+ 1)/2]
where q ∈ [01] and z ∈ [−1 q]. The latter implies that the support of the boundary ker-
nel does not extend beyond the left boundary. Müller and Wang (1994) plot K(qz) as
a function of z for various values of q. As expected K(1 z) is again the Epanechnikov
kernel. As q decreases, the kernel becomes more and more skewed, and the weight as-
signed to values close to the boundary increases strongly. There is a positive probability
that the resulting θ˜(0) is negative, in which case it is replaced by zero.
18This smoothes the increments of the Nelson–Aalen estimator Λn(t) of the integrated hazard based on
a random sample of n subjects,
Λn(t)=
∑
i:T(i)≤t
δ(i)
n− i+ 1 
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The boundary correction establishes a reduction of the bias. At the same time, the
variance of the estimator increases, because the number of observations used to es-
timate the hazard close to 0 becomes smaller. A further variance reduction can be
achieved by choosing a larger bandwidth close to 0 than elsewhere. Müller and Wang
(1994) therefore propose to use local bandwidths b(t). In that case, b is replaced by b(t).
As functions of n, the local bandwidths bn(t) are assumed to satisfy the usual condi-
tions (somewhat loosely, bn(t) → 0, nbn(t) → ∞). Optimal local bandwidths are such
that nb5n(t) converges to a number smaller than infinity, so bn(t)∼ n−
1
5 . The asymptotic
behavior of the estimator is not fundamentally different from usual. The convergence
rate is n−
2
5 . Optimal global or local bandwidths can be consistently estimated by a data-
adaptive procedure, along with the estimates of interest (see Müller and Wang (1994)). In
Appendix B, we present the algorithm, slightly modified in response to our experiences
regarding the performance of the estimator.
Asymptotic normality allows for the estimation of a confidence interval for θ(0). Fol-
lowing the line of reasoning in e.g. Härdle (1994) and Härdle, Müller, Sperlich, and Wer-
watz (2004), one could ignore the asymptotic bias term to obtain an approximate 95%
confidence interval (see Müller et al. (2004), for an application of the idea of omitting
the asymptotic bias in the related case of boundary kernel density estimation). Concep-
tually, it is not difficult to include the asymptotic bias term in the confidence interval,
but in practice this involves nonparametric estimation of the second derivative of the
hazard at 0. An alternative that we follow in the empirical application below is to use
bootstrapping to obtain confidence intervals.19
Müller and Wang (1994), Hess, Serachitopol, and Brown (1999), and Jiang and Dok-
sum (2003) provide Monte Carlo simulation results for the estimator. They conclude that
it has an excellent performance in samples sizes n as small as 50 to 250. Hess, Serachi-
topol, and Brown (1999) compare the performance to that of other kernel estimators.
They show that the other estimators perform worse, in particular at the left boundary,
and they demonstrate that both the boundary correction and the data-adaptive local
bandwidth are important in this respect.
Instead of boundary kernel approaches, one may use local linear smoothing (or local
linear fitting, or locally weighted least squares) as a nonparametric approach to deal with
estimation at a boundary. Wang (2005) gives an intuitive overview of local linear haz-
ard rate estimation, while Nielsen and Tanggaard (2001), Jiang and Doksum (2003), and
Bagkavos and Patil (2008) provide details.20 The asymptotic properties of the estimator
are qualitatively identical to those of the boundary kernel hazard estimator. Jiang and
Doksum (2003) compare both methods with data-adaptive local bandwidths, in some
Monte-Carlo simulation experiments. Both methods give similar results and both per-
form very well at the boundary, where their relative ranking depends on the shape of the
true hazard rate.
19This is proposed by Müller et al. (2004). See, for example, John and Jawad (2010) for an empirical appli-
cation of nonparametric bootstrapping of standard errors of boundary kernel hazard estimates. Note that
despite the local nature of our estimator, the size of treated and control cohorts increases with sample size
and the estimator is linear. In such circumstances, bootstrapping is expected to provide correct standard
errors.
20Local linear estimation of hazard rates is related to fixed design nonparametric regression.
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The results of this subsection can be straightforwardly applied for inference on the
difference of two independently estimated hazard rates. Appendix A discusses inference
of the ratio of two independently estimated hazard rates.
4.2 Implementation issues
We consider a number of dimensions in which the econometric inference can be im-
proved or modified.
(i) The “comparison” cohort(s) In Section 4.1, we used a boundary-corrected estima-
tor for the observed hazard θT (t0|XS = t1) at t0 in the comparison cohort that is even-
tually exposed to the reform at some higher duration t1 > t0. Instead, one may use a
standard kernel (or local linear or local constant) hazard estimator, if one is prepared
to assume that this hazard is smooth in an interval around t0, since then the estima-
tion concerns the interior of an interval on which the hazard is smooth. Whether this
assumption makes sense depends on the setting at hand. At certain elapsed durations
t0 of interest, the eligibility to other policy measures may change, causing the individual
hazard rates θT(s)(t|XV ) to be discontinuous at t = t0 for all s. The application in Sec-
tion 5 is a case in point. To rule out that this affects the estimated effects, one needs to
resort to boundary correction methods.
Analogously, one may examine the left-hand limit of the observed θT (t|XS = t0) at
t = t0 in order to estimate the “control” hazard, but this also requires the assumption
that there are no other sources of discontinuities at t0.
Note that one may widen the “control group” and increase the precision of the es-
timates of interest, by estimating θT (t0|X t2 > S ≥ t1) with t0 < t1 < t2 ≤ ∞, instead of
θT (t0|XS = t1). This does come at a price, namely that Assumption 1, ruling out the ab-
sence of cohort effects, needs to be extended to multiple comparison cohorts flowing in
at or before τ∗ − t1. Recall that we require unobserved cohort effects to be absent, since
otherwise S⊥ V |X so that Assumption 1 is violated. Observable cohort indicators may
be included in X , but note that in nonparametric analysis any addition to X adds to the
curse of dimensionality.21
Instead of enlarging the “control group,” one may use the availability of multiple po-
tential comparison cohorts in order to select the most similar cohort (or set of cohorts)
among the cohorts flowing in before τ∗ − t0. We do not observe the distribution of V |X
in a cohort, but we observe outcomes that are informative on it, namely the duration
distribution on the duration interval [0 τ∗) in the corresponding cohort. As a selection
mechanism, one may match on the survival probability in the cohort at duration τ∗, or,
even stronger, on the shape of the duration distribution in the cohort on the duration
interval [0 τ∗). The more similar this shape, the more similar the composition of sur-
vivors at the duration τ∗. At the extreme, if alternative cohorts are equally adequate, this
21It may be an interesting topic for further research to examine under which conditions the presence of
multiple comparison cohorts enables the identification of anticipation effects that violate Assumption 2.
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provides overidentifying information that can be used to test the validity of our frame-
work.22
If one comparison cohort is to be selected, then one may consider a cohort that
flowed in only marginally earlier than the “treated” cohort, following the line of thought
that unobserved changes of the entry composition of the cohorts are a smooth func-
tion of the moment of entry. However, such a choice of t1 being almost equal to t0 has a
practical disadvantage in small samples. To see this, notice that θT (t|XS = t1) may dis-
play a discontinuity at t1, so the value θT (t0|XS = t1) at the elapsed duration t0 < t1 can
only be estimated from observed realized durations in an interval to the right of t0 that
does not stretch beyond t1. Spells in the comparison cohort with durations exceeding t1
should be treated as right-censored at t1. Consequently, the measure of realized dura-
tion outcomes that is informative on θT (t0|XS = t1) is very small if t1 is only marginally
larger than t0.
(ii) Observed covariates Including many elements in X raises a curse of dimensionality
in the nonparametric estimation. One may therefore choose to treat the observed co-
variates X as unobservables, and hence subsume them into V . This involves a strength-
ening of Assumption 1, in the sense that it requires S⊥X . The latter can be empirically
verified by examining the composition of the cohorts used to estimate the objects of
interest. If S⊥ X is satisfied then treating X as unobservables in the estimation of the
objects of interest does not involve a strengthening of Assumption 1. In practice, one
may therefore verify that S⊥X and, if this holds, proceed by ignoring X in the duration
analysis.23
With discrete X , nonparametric inference would typically lead to separate estima-
tions for each value of X . This would also allow for the selection of the most similar
control cohort for each value of X separately. To aggregate the estimated average effects
over X , one may average the estimated effects given X over the relevant distribution
of X .24
(iii) Discrete time Now let us reconsider the continuous nature of the duration variable.
Sometimes a continuous-time analysis may be unfeasible. For example, the data may be
time-aggregated in the sense that events are recorded in time intervals (e.g., unemploy-
ment duration is collected in months even though individuals may enter employment
on any given workday). Alternatively, duration outcomes may be discrete due to institu-
tional constraints (e.g., in certain occupations a job can only start on the first day of a
month).
Accordingly, we distinguish between two frameworks. In one, the model is in
continuous-time and the duration outcomes are in discrete time. In the other, both
are in discrete time. In the first framework, the results of Section 3 apply but we can-
not estimate hazard rates. However, we can estimate conditional survival probabilities
22Both the idea of matching on pre-exposure outcomes and the idea of using multiple compari-
son cohorts for overidentifying information are in the spirit of the principles for choosing among non-
experimental evaluation methods as laid out by Heckman and Hotz (1989).
23Such a pretest affects the precision of the inference on the effect of interest.
24With time-varying X , the approaches of this Subection 4.2(ii) also apply.
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and their differences, as outlined in Section 3. In general, results obtained in this frame-
work can be viewed as approximations of those for hazard rates obtained in a genuine
continuous-time framework. Because of the ease with which survival probability out-
comes can be estimated, this approach may be useful from a practical point of view.
However, this may come at the cost of ignoring short-term fluctuations of duration de-
terminants such as seasonal effects. As for the second framework, the analysis of Sec-
tion 3 is straightforwardly modified to such settings by working with a genuine discrete-
time framework. We examine this empirically in Section 5 below.
(iv) Reduced-form model estimation Empirical duration analysis often specifies pa-
rameterized models to estimate the objects of interest. In a setting with a compulsory
reform affecting ongoing spells, an obvious choice would be to estimate a Proportional
Hazard (PH) model for the distribution of T |XS, using all available cohorts, with S rep-
resented by way of a simple time-varying covariate I(t ≥ τ∗ − τ0),
θT (t|Xτ0)= λ(t)exp
(
X ′β+ αI(t ≥ τ∗ − τ0))
where α is the parameter of interest. Such a model does not explicitly include unob-
served heterogeneity. However, one may simply interpret it as a parsimonious descrip-
tion of patterns in the data averaged over unobservables, i.e. as a simple representa-
tion of a distribution that is generated by an underlying model for individual hazard
rates with unobserved heterogeneity. In that case, the question is whether the parame-
ter α still captures a causal effect. It follows from our results that to some extent it does.
Specifically, if we abstract from the restrictiveness of the PH model structure and po-
tential misspecification, then α in this model captures the average causal policy effect
at τ∗ − τ0 on the hazard rate. So, the averaged policy effect is estimated correctly when
using a model that ignores unobserved heterogeneity even if in reality there is unob-
served heterogeneity. It follows that the estimate obtained under the assumption of no
unobserved heterogeneity is in fact controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. This is in
marked contrast to single-spell duration analysis with time-invariant covariates, where
ignoring unobserved heterogeneity typically leads to biased covariate effect estimates
(see van den Berg (2001) for an overview). Obviously, it is essential that the analysis uses
data that include spells that are ongoing at the moment of the policy change. Note that
the model does not require continuity of the hazard function in t.
Hall and Hartman (2010) provide an example of a study in which a PH model is esti-
mated using spells interrupted by a policy change. Specifically, they estimate a PH model
for the transition rate from unemployment into sickness absence as a function of the
sickness benefit policy regime, using unemployment spells that cover a date at which a
policy regime change was implemented. They find that a reduced cap for sickness ben-
efits lowers the transition rate to sickness absence by about 35% in the treated popu-
lation. In their study, they also estimate MPH-type model extensions that allow for un-
observed heterogeneity as proportional fixed effects in the individual hazard rates, ex-
ploiting the fact that the data contain multiple unemployment spells for many subjects.
Interestingly, they find that the estimated policy effect is virtually identical to that in
their main analysis, suggesting that, indeed, this coefficient is estimated correctly even
when ignoring unobserved heterogeneity.
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(v) Dynamic treatment evaluation The results of Section 3 can be applied to dynamic
treatment evaluation settings. In such settings, the exposure to a treatment is not neces-
sarily due to some institutional change at a fixed point in time. Rather, different individ-
uals in the same cohort are exposed to a treatment at different elapsed durations, where
the treatment may affect the individual hazard from the moment of exposure onwards.
Typically, S is only observed if S ≤ T . It may be interesting to reassess Assumptions 1
and 2 in such settings. Abbring and van den Berg (2003) demonstrate that Assumptions 1
and 2 are fundamental in the following sense: any causal model is observationally equiv-
alent to a model in which these two assumptions are satisfied. If one of the assumptions
is relaxed then point identification requires additional structure.
5. Empirical application
5.1 The New Deal for Young People (NDYP): Policy regime and treatment
The NDYP was a welfare-to-work program introduced in the UK in the late 1990s. It tar-
geted the young unemployed, aged 18 to 24, who had been claiming unemployment
benefits (UB, known as Job Seekers’ Allowance in the UK) for at least 6 months. Partic-
ipation was compulsory upon reaching 6 months in the claimant count, and refusal to
participate could be punished with a temporary benefits withdrawal. Since entitlement
to UB in the UK is neither time-limited nor dependent on past working history, and eli-
gibility is constrained only by a means-test that most young people pass, the NDYP was
effectively targeted at all young long-term unemployed (long-term being defined as 6
months or more). As UB entitlement is gained upon visiting the employment office, we
simply use the term “unemployed” to signify those in the UB claiming count and we use
unemployment duration and duration of the claiming spell inter-changeably.
After enrollment,25 the treatment was split into three stages: a first period of up to
4 months of intensive job search assistance called the Gateway, with fortnightly meet-
ings with a personal adviser; next, for those unable to find work in that period, a pe-
riod with four alternative programs including subsidized employment, full-time edu-
cation or training, work experience in the voluntary sector and work experience in an
environment-focused organization;26 and a final period of intensive job search assis-
tance called the Follow Through.27
The NDYP treated millions of people before being replaced by another program in
2009, the Flexible New Deal. For instance, 172,000 new participants entered the NDYP in
2006 alone, and the average number of participants at any month during that year was
25Throughout the section we use “enrollment” to denote actual mandatory participation in the job
search assistance program and subsequent programs. As we shall see, actual participation may start strictly
later than the moment at which the NDYP policy was introduced.
26These options would last for up to 6 months (or 12 months in the case of education).
27Repeated participation in the four alternative treatments could be arranged if perceived beneficial.
More details on the program can be found in White and Knight (2002), Podivinsky and McVicar (2002),
Blundell, Costa Dias, Meghir, and Van Reenen (2004), Van Reenen (2004) or Dorsett (2006). The NDYP has
been the subject of a number of evaluations studies; see Blundell et al. (2004), De Giorgi (2005), and Costa
Dias, Ichimura, and van den Berg (2013).
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93,000. The per-year expenditure of the NDYP during the 2000s was in the order of GBP
200 million, excluding administrative costs (DWP (Department for Work and Pensions)
(2006)), but a large proportion of this cost is UB payments that would be due indepen-
dently of the program.
5.2 The introduction of the policy
The NDYP was released nationwide on April 1, 1998; this is calendar time τ∗. The ex-
isting stock of those who were unemployed for at least 6 months at τ∗ was gradually
moved into the program. At τ∗, only those whose elapsed unemployment duration was
an integer multiple of 6 months were enrolled. Enrollment took place at the job-focused
interviews the unemployed individuals attend every 6 months, provided they are aged
25 at the first interview after the NDYP was implemented. If the elapsed duration was
not an integer multiple of 6 months, then the individual was enrolled at the moment
that his or her elapsed duration attained an integer multiple of 6 months, provided that
he or she was not yet 25 years old at that point in time. In the empirical analysis we do
not exploit the age eligibility criterion except for robustness checks.
Figure 4 illustrates the enrollment scheme in the years around τ∗. This scheme is
somewhat more complicated than that described in Section 3.3, but it supports the iden-
tification and nonparametric estimation of average causal effects of the arrival of infor-
mation about the new policy for all elapsed durations t ≥ 0. For elapsed durations that
are integer multiples of 6 months, this is the effect of enrolling in the program; for other
elapsed durations, it is the effect of anticipating potential participation at the time of the
next interview. To avoid misunderstandings, note that the latter is not in conflict with As-
sumption 2, which is still required. Specifically, individuals are not allowed to anticipate
Figure 4. Introduction of the NDYP. Notes: Diagonal lines depict cohorts. Each cohort moves
along its own line as t and τ increase in tune. In the grey area, individuals are enrolled in the job
search assistance program.
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the moment at which the information arrives, which is the time of the reform, τ∗.28 No-
tice that it is not possible to identify effects of the actual participation in the NDYP at 6
months among those who are unemployed for less than 6 months at τ∗, since such indi-
viduals may act upon the information about the future treatment throughout the time
interval between τ∗ and the moment that t = 6.
Two minor institutional features constitute deviations from the above description of
the introduction of the policy. First, individuals with t < 6 at τ∗ can try to apply for early
enrollment, especially if they are disadvantaged (disabled, former convict or lacking ba-
sic skills). Such applications were rare at the initial stages of the program. Secondly, the
NDYP was introduced in a few small pilot areas on January 1, 1998, i.e. 3 months be-
fore the national rollout. We use the data from these areas and shift calendar time with
3 months when combining these data with the data from the rest of the country. Since
the pilot study did not receive massive attention before April 1, and the evaluation of
the pilot was not completed on April 1, we feel that the risk of information spillovers is
small.
5.3 Data
The empirical analysis is based on the JUVOS longitudinal dataset, a 5% random sample
of the register data of all UB claiming spells. JUVOS records the entire claiming histo-
ries of sampled individuals since 1982. Information includes the start and ending dates
of each claiming spell as well as the destination upon leaving (since 1996, but plagued
with missing values), and a small number of demographic variables such as age, gen-
der, marital status, geographic location, previous occupation, and sought occupation.
JUVOS contains no information about what happens while off benefits and the infor-
mation on destination upon leaving is plagued with missing values (over 30% of spells).
Therefore, we will focus on “all exits from the claimant count” as the outcome of interest,
irrespective of destination.
The estimation sample is formed of men who were aged between 20 to 24 upon
reaching 6 months in unemployment. We discard observations for younger individuals
to avoid having to deal with education decisions.
5.3.1 The choice of treatment and comparison groups for estimating the effect of enrolling
in the NDYP We estimate the ATS(t0) for t0 equal to 6 months (precisely 182 days).
Recall from Section 3.3 that the measures ATTS and ATNTS are equal to this. Estimation
relies on comparing the survivors among the cohort attaining the elapsed duration t0 at
τ∗ (which we call the treatment group, or the treated) with a similar sample of survivors
from earlier cohorts (the comparison groups). Following the discussion in Section 4.2,
we do not condition on covariates X .
The continuous-time framework must be reconciled with the requirement of a pos-
itive sample size. In practice, we need samples of cohorts flowing into unemployment
28Blundell et al. (2004) study anticipation of the reform (and hence of the moment of the corresponding
information arrival) on April 1, 1998, by exploiting spatial and age discontinuities. No significant anticipa-
tory effects are found.
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within time intervals rather than at two singular points in time. To proceed, we consider
full monthly cohorts. For instance, the treated sample includes all spells starting in Octo-
ber 1997 (or July 1997 in pilot areas), lasting for at least 6 months. This choice is not fully
innocuous as discussed in Section 5.2: those starting a spell towards the end of October
1997 will have been exposed to the new policy for a few weeks before enrolling, and this
may lead to biased inference. The bias should be negligible if the anticipatory effects
within weeks of the reform are much smaller than the impact of participation. We argue
below that the distortion may lead to an underestimation of ATS(t0) at 6 months.29
We define comparison groups in an analogous way, selecting individuals reaching
182 days in unemployment over an entire calendar month prior to April 1998. As can-
didate groups, we consider the cohorts flowing in during June 1997 (pilot areas) and
September 1997 (nonpilot areas), or May 1997 and August 1997, or July 1996 and Octo-
ber 1996, or the combination of June and September 1997 with July and October 1996.
We include data on both pilot and nonpilot regions in all that follows but designate each
cohort by the month of inflow in non-pilot areas for simplicity. Following the discussion
in Section 4.2, different candidate groups are assessed based on two outcomes: the dis-
tribution of observed characteristics X among survivors at 182 days and the distribution
of T on days 1 to 181.
We start by contrasting the observed characteristics of survivors at 6 months in the
treatment and comparison groups. Table 1 shows some summary statistics. The first take
away from the table is that the cohorts are small. This is a consequence of the time win-
dow for inflow being narrowly defined to capture the discontinuous change in policy
while ensuring that the cohorts are comparable and live through the same economic
environment. Rows 1 and 2 in the table also show that the sample size for men is almost
three times larger than that for women. We suspect that this is partly driven by fertil-
ity decisions and their interaction with the labor supply and entitlement to benefits of
women. In particular, non-working mothers are entitled to “Income Support”, a benefit
that replaces UB and neither requires active job search nor triggers enrollment into the
NDYP. With such small sample sizes, the empirical analysis for women is not viable and
therefore we will be focusing only on the effects of the NDYP among young men.
Descriptives for men at the bottom of the table show that all comparison groups re-
semble the treatment group in column 1, but the similarities in past claiming behaviour
are stronger for the September and August 1997 cohorts. Table 2 quantifies the differ-
ences in the empirical distributions of observed covariates among the survivors in the
treatment and comparison groups. It confirms that the September and August 1997 co-
horts display no discernible differences to the treatment group (columns 1 and 2). Nei-
ther the October 1996 nor the combined cohort perform as well, with systematic differ-
ences in the claiming history during the three years prior to inflow (column 4).
To shed more light on dynamic selection prior to 6 months, Figure 5 plots the sur-
vival functions over the pretreatment period, up to 181 days into unemployment. For
29Clearly, it is preferable to apply an estimator in which the inflow time interval shrinks as the sample size
increases, such that observations from cohorts close to the inflow date of interest are given more weight.
Given our modest sample sizes, we do not pursue such an approach, and we leave this as a topic for further
research.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the different cohorts, conditional on survival in claimant
count to 182 days.
Cohort
Oct 97 Sep 97 Aug 97 Oct 96 Sep 97 + Oct 96
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
# Observations
Men 455 456 368 557 1013
Women 161 188 117 186 374
Men Only
Singles (proportion) 0865 0864 0850 0895 0881
Mean age at inflow 217 214 215 217 216
Claiming time in last 3 yrs 0416 0389 0419 0382 0385
Mean # claiming spells in last 3 yrs 209 204 202 184 193
No claims in last 3 yrs 0112 0135 0122 0161 0150
Note: Treatment group in column 1, alternative comparison groups in columns 2 to 5. The variables in rows 5 to 7 describe
the UB claiming history in the 3 years preceding inflow into current claiming spell.
the combined cohort, the matching is so close that the curve is hardly distinguishable
from the curve for the treatment group. The survival function for the September 1997
cohort diverges from that for the treatment group during the December/January period
but quickly returns to match it over the final 2 months of the interval. For our purposes,
what matters is whether treatment and comparison groups are similar at the time of en-
rollment. We cannot reject such hypothesis for the September 1997 cohort. The August
1997 cohort curve also converges towards the treatment cohort curve in the last month
before enrollment, but the match is not as close as for the September 1997 cohort. The
Table 2. Treatment vs. comparison groups—p-values for Hotelling statistics comparing the dis-
tribution of covariates conditional on survival up to 181 days of unemployment.
Comparison Cohort
Sep 97 Aug 97 Oct 96 Sep 97 + Oct 96
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Marital status 0997 0643 0114 0509
Age 0307 0299 0916 0942
Region 0276 0095 0112 0083
Occupation 0767 0575 0302 0532
Claiming time in last 3 yrs 0363 0846 0.021 0.046
# claiming spells in last 3 yrs 0801 0454 0.000 0.006
No claims in last 3 yrs 0353 0747 0.020 0164
All covariates 0761 0517 0.001 0085
# observations 456 368 557 1013
Note: The treatment group is the October 1997 cohort. The variables in rows 5 to 7 describe the UB claiming history in the
3 years preceding inflow into current unemployment spell. Numbers in bold highlight statistically significant differences in the
distribution of the covariate, at the 5% level.
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Figure 5. Treatment vs. comparison groups—empirical survival functions between 0 and 6
months after inflow.
exception to this pattern is the October 1996 cohort. The survival function for this cohort
is systematically above that for the treatment group over the entire interval, suggesting
that aggregate conditions in the market changed during the year.
Further evidence of the similarities between the treatment and comparison cohorts
can be gathered from contrasting their hazard rates in the pre-treatment period. Fig-
ure 6 does so for durations 90 to 181 days. The differences between the hazard rates
are small and mostly not statistically significant at conventional levels. In just one case,
when contrasting the treated with the August 1997 cohort, is there evidence of seasonal
effects differentially affecting the hazard rates, but this effect is mild even in this case.
Thus, the evidence in Figures 5 and 6 supports two cohorts, September 1997 and
October 1996, for constructing the counterfactual. In turn, as we have seen, the distri-
bution of observed covariates among survivors at 6 months suggests that the best candi-
dates are the September and August 1997 cohorts. Based on these results, we select the
September 1997 cohort as the comparison group and discard alternatives. As it turns
out, our results are robust to the choice of the comparison group (estimates available
upon request).30
We finish this subsection by noticing that the September 1997 comparison cohort is
eligible for treatment upon reaching 12months in the claimant count as they are past the
6 months threshold at the time of the reform. The arrival of information about the new
program may affect their behavior and confound estimates of the ATS at 6 months. This
source of bias can be eliminated by right-censoring spells in the comparison group when
they cross the time of the reform, τ∗. However, any anticipating response at 6 months is
likely to be negligible as eligibility is far into the future. We checked the sensitivity of the
results and they are robust to right-censoring (estimates available upon request).
30This alleviates pre-testing concerns alluded to in footnote 23.
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Figure 6. Treatment vs. comparison groups—differences in the hazard rates before the policy
reform, at durations 90 to 181 days. Note: Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals.
5.3.2 The choice of treatment and comparison groups for estimating the anticipation ef-
fects of the NDYP We also estimate anticipation effects induced by the arrival of infor-
mation about the reform among those approaching enrollment. These are interesting
per se, and are also informative about the accuracy of estimates of the impact of program
participation that ignore anticipation, by exposing the extent to which anticipation al-
ters the composition of the treatment group prior to participation. The population we
consider is again that of individuals who will be aged 20 to 24 when reaching 6 months
of unemployment. We may estimate the anticipatory effects of future enrollment evalu-
ated at each duration t0 shorter than 6 months (182 days). In this analysis, “treatment”
means exposure to information about future enrollment while “comparison” means the
absence of such exposure. Thus, the treatment and comparison groups are now defined
in reference to whether they are exposed to the information arrival at the reform date.
For a given t0 < 6 months, the treatment group now consists of individuals who reach t0
during April 1998. In line with the procedure described above to choose a comparison
group, we take the group who enter unemployment one month earlier and hence reach
duration t0 < 6 during March 1998.
Figure 7 displays the survival functions up to t0 for the treatment and comparison
groups for t0 equal to 2, 3, 4, and 5 months. There are some signs of seasonal differential
selection during December/January. The survival functions for later cohorts, crossing
December/January earlier in their spells (panels B and C), diverge throughout the dura-
tion interval (0 t0), especially at the end of the period, when approaching April (treat-
ment) or March (comparison). Post December/January cohorts (panel A) are unaffected
by conditions in those months and exhibit very similar survival functions. Earlier co-
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Figure 7. Empirical survival functions for cohorts reaching durations of 2 (panel A) to 5
(panel D) months in April 1998 (treatment group) or March 1998 (comparison group). Note:
Dashed lines represent 95% confidence intervals. Treatment and comparison here refer to ex-
posure to information about future enrollment.
horts (panel D) are also affected but return quickly to a common path. The latter finding
echoes the observed patterns for the October and September cohorts in Figure 5.
Table 3 compares the empirical distributions of observed covariates among the sur-
vivors in the treatment and comparison groups for different t0. Column 2 shows that
the December 1997 and January 1998 cohorts are compositionally different upon hav-
ing reached 3 months in unemployment. For earlier cohorts, the absence of statistically
significant differences further supports their comparability (columns 3 and 4). In the
light of these findings, our analysis of anticipatory effects focuses on durations from 4 to
5 months. These are the most relevant comparisons as anticipatory effects will be larger
at dates closer to enrollment in the NDYP.
In contrast to our earlier discussion on the estimation of enrollment effects, right-
censoring at times shortly after calendar time τ∗ is expected to be important here, as
the comparison group will itself be subject to the information arrival on April 1, 1998.
Moreover, the treatment group will enroll into job search assistance upon 6 months of
unemployment, with, potentially, causal effects on their hazard rate from that moment
onwards. We examine these two issues below.
5.4 The effect of enrollment in the NDYP
We estimate effects in discrete and in continuous time. Estimates in discrete time cap-
ture effects on aggregate monthly conditional transition probabilities while estimates in
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Table 3. Treatment vs. comparison groups—p-values for Hotelling statistics comparing the dis-
tribution of covariates conditional on survival up to 2 to 5 months of unemployment.
Month of Inflow
Treatment Group: Feb 98 Jan 98 Dec 97 Nov 97
Comparison Group: Jan 98 Dec 97 Nov 97 Oct 97
Elapsed Duration t0: 2 Months 3 Months 4 Months 5 Months
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Marital status 0471 0339 0790 0656
Age 0120 0263 0366 0318
Region 0425 0304 0671 0858
Occupation 0338 0234 0410 0603
Claiming time in the last 3 yrs 0188 0.015 0439 0921
# claiming spells in the last 3 yrs 0303 0.021 0242 0387
No claims in the last 3 yrs 0626 0167 0271 0589
All covariates 0222 0.037 0599 0893
Note: Row 1 (2) details the inflow date of the treatment (comparison) group for the evaluation of the effect at the elapsed
duration in row 3. Treatment and comparison here refer to exposure to information about future enrollment. The variables in
rows 8 to 10 describe the UB claiming history in the 3 years preceding inflow into current unemployment spells. Numbers in
bold highlight statistically significant differences in the distribution of the covariate, at the 5% level.
continuous time do the same for daily hazard rates. Both sets of estimates are based on
the same treated and comparison samples.
Table 4 presents the main results for the discrete-time setting. The figure in column 1
is the estimated ATS at 6 months for the average causal effect of enrolling in the NDYP
program on the conditional probability of leaving unemployment within one month of
enrollment. We find a substantial impact of 45 percentage points (pp). This estimate
is significantly positive at the 5% level. The corresponding relative increase in the con-
ditional probability is about 35% and is in line with the results in Blundell et al. (2004)
based on a difference-in-differences approach.
Columns 2 and 3 of the table display placebo effects. The figure in column 2 is the
ATS estimate at 6months for the non-existing reform of April 1997; the entry in column 3
is the ATS at 6months for the older non-eligible group of 25–29 year olds. If our method is
appropriate, these estimates should be statistically insignificant. Alternatively, they may
reflect the presence of seasonal effects, macro effects or other differential changes af-
fecting the composition of contrasting groups at inflow or their dynamic selection prior
to reaching 6 months in unemployment. As it turns out, neither of the two estimates is
statistically significant. This result does not invalidate our approach.
Figure 8 displays the continuous-time counterparts of the ATS estimates in column 1
of the table. It shows both the additive and the multiplicative average effects, together
with 95% confidence intervals based on the analytic asymptotic variance without bias
correction.31 Although t0 = 182 days is the minimum elapsed unemployment duration
for enrollment in the NDYP, it is conceivable that program participation requires a posi-
31Pointwise confidence intervals, not uniform. With bootstrapping, we obtain virtually the same inter-
vals. The estimated optimal local bandwidth for the additive effect at the boundary of 182 days is 80 days
with a standard error of 30 days.
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Table 4. Nonparametric discrete-time estimation of the average causal ef-
fect ATS(t0) of enrolling into NDYP at the elapsed duration of t0 = 6 months,
on the conditional probability of leaving within 1 month.
Treatment Effect Placebo Effects
Age: 20–24 Years 20–24 Years 25–29 Years
τ∗: April 1, 1998 April 1, 1997 April 1, 1998
(1) (2) (3)
Effect estimate 0.049 0014 −0011
Standard error (0023) (0022) (0024)
# individuals 911 1118 862
Note: Estimates in bold are statistically significant at the 5% level.
tive amount of time to act and exert any effect due to short delays in the timing of the 6-
month interview (when the information about the treatment is shared with the treated).
Therefore, we plot estimates at elapsed durations from 182 to 212 days. A zero effect in
the early days after 182 suggests no differential dynamic selection between the treatment
and comparison groups at this stage, allowing the ATS to be identified for a later elapsed
duration.
Figure 8. Nonparametric continuous-time estimates of the average effect of enrolling in the
NDYP at elapsed duration of 6 months on the hazard rate of leaving unemployment. Note: Es-
timates using Müller and Wang method with optimal local bandwidths. Dashed lines represent
95% confidence intervals.
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The estimated patterns are similar for the additive and multiplicative average ef-
fects.32 The focus should be on the impact at the first duration beyond 182 days for which
the effect is significant. Any features after that may be due to duration dependence of the
treatment effect or to differential dynamic selection, or both. We find significant effects
of enrollment only after about a week into the program. At that time, the estimated effect
as a function of the elapsed duration jumps rather abruptly to a positive level of about
0006 per day. This amounts to more than doubling the hazard rate in the absence of
NDYP, as can be seen from the figure for the multiplicative effect (right-hand-side panel
of Figure 8). The estimated effect then drops to a lower positive level that just misses
the 95% significance level, although at this stage we can no longer separate causal and
confounding compositional effects. We conclude that among those who enter the new
policy regime at 6 months of unemployment duration, the program has a significant and
sizeable positive effect on the hazard rate at 6 months.
Recall that the NDYP between 6 and 10 months is effectively a job search assis-
tance program. The finding that the NDYP has a positive effect on reemployment at 6
months is in line with the evidence in overview studies that report positive effects of job
search assistance on reemployment outcomes (see e.g. Card, Kluve, and Weber (2010),
and Crépon and van den Berg (2016)). Of course, many previous studies use more para-
metric evaluation methods (or exploit other discontinuities) than we do.
To compare our results to those based on such parametric methods, we perform an
empirical analysis that mimics the parametric approach in the literature, estimating a
parametric proportional hazard model. We select a larger treatment group, comprised
of all spells starting in the 6 month period prior to the reform, and a larger control group,
comprised of all spells starting during the same 6months 1 year earlier. This takes care of
seasonal variation that could confound effects. We follow the usual practice of artificially
right-censoring all comparison spells at the time of the reform. This procedure does not
significantly affect the results because the spells in our comparison group start up to 18
months before the reform, and few survive that long. We assume a Weibull distribution
and allow for other observable covariates in one of the specifications.33
The relevant parameter estimates are shown in Table 5. These concern coefficients
in the proportional hazard model and are thus hazard ratio effects. They are best com-
pared with the estimates pictured on the right panel of Figure 8. Our parametric esti-
mates are much smaller than the effects estimated using our non-parametric approach,
at durations 190–195 days. This is in line with the subsequent sharp decline in the effects
displayed in Figure 8, which we have argued does not have a causal interpretation since
the initial effects change differentially the composition of survivors among the treated.
What the parametric estimates are capturing is an average change in the hazard rates
over an extended period after the 6months enrollment threshold, which cannot be given
the causal interpretation if the program affects the composition of survivals over time.34
32Inference for the multiplicative effect warrants an additional assumption (Assumption 3 in the Ap-
pendix A).
33We have experimented with alternative specifications and definitions of the treatment and comparison
groups, including the option to left-truncate spell durations at 6 months. All results show similar patterns.
34We have experimented with alternative specifications and definitions of the treatment and comparison
groups. All our results show similar patterns.
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Table 5. Estimates of the effect of enrolling in the
NDYP 6 months after the start of the spell, on the haz-
ard rates after 6 months—coefficients in a proportional
hazard model.
No Other With
Covariates Covariates
(1) (2)
Effect of enrolling in the NDYP 1.221 1.252
Standard error (0031) (0031)
# individuals 22,241
Note: Estimates in bold are statistically significant at the 1% level.
Other covariates in column 2 include age, an indicator for being in an
area where the pilot study was held, and indicators for marital status,
proportion of time claiming UB in the 1 and 3 years prior to the start of
current spell, and number of claiming spells in the 1 and 3 years prior to
the start of current spell.
The comparison of estimates in columns 1 and 2 confirms that the inclusion of the small
set of observed covariates does not alter the results.
5.5 The effect of information about future enrollment
Table 6 presents the discrete-time estimates of the additive ATS at 4 months and 5
months (column 1). Both are negative, but none is significantly different from zero, sug-
gesting that individuals do not react in advance to the prospect of future participation
in the NDYP. This suggests that estimates of the impact of participation in the NDYP us-
ing methodologies that ignore anticipation are not biased. Yet these are averages over
potentially heterogeneous effects, so a zero average does not rule out that some indi-
viduals anticipate the job search assistance, and hence, that Assumption 2 is violated.
Moreover, the finer continuous-time analysis may reveal other patterns.
The estimates in columns 2 and 3 are placebo effects similar to those in Table 4.
They are statistically insignificant, except for 20–24-year-olds 5 months after inflow in
1997, when no reform took place. The latter estimate is based on a comparison of those
who flowed in November 1996 to those who flowed in in October 1996. While we cannot
exclude the presence of seasonality (or other) effects driving this estimate, it is telling
that similar patterns cannot be found for the older group over the same period or for the
same age group over other adjacent months (September to October or from November
to December).35
The estimates in Table 6 may be biased if the 1-month time interval used in esti-
mating the conditional outflow probability for the comparison group crosses April 1,
1998, when information about the NDYP is released—a bias towards zero if the treated
and comparison groups react similarly to the disclose of information. We therefore right
censor spells for the comparison group when they cross April 1, 1998. Likewise, treat-
ment spells are right censored at 6 months. We show in Section 5.4 that the causal ef-
fect of participation kicks in at an elapsed duration of 189 days, so we use this as the
35Results available from the authors.
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Table 6. Nonparametric discrete-time estimation of the average causal ef-
fect ATS(t0) of receiving information at elapsed durations t0 = 4 or 5 months
about enrollment at 6 months, on the conditional probability of leaving un-
employment within 1 month.
Treatment Effect Placebo Effects
Age: 20–24 Years 20–24 Years 25–29 Years
τ∗: April 1, 1998 April 1, 1997 April 1, 1998
(1) (2) (3)
4 months after inflow −0011 0003 −0017
(0022) (0021) (0021)
1328 1365 1208
5 months after inflow −0019 0.057 0021
(0021) (0021) (0022)
1098 1228 1034
Note: Estimates, standard errors and numbers of observations are in the first, second and third
line, respectively. Estimates in bold are statistically significant at the 5% level.
right-censoring value. We then use the resulting possibly right-censored data to esti-
mate the effects of information arrival at elapsed durations 4 to 5 months in continuous
time. Given the high data demands of this procedure, which requires a sufficiently large
number of informative spells at each elapsed duration, we restrict the continuous-time
analysis to durations 123 to 181 days.
Figure 9 shows the continuous-time estimates of the ATS for the arrival of informa-
tion on future participation. Notice that the computational burden required to produce
Figure 9 is much higher than for Figure 8. Figure 8 is based on the estimation of two
nonparametric hazard rates, for two cohorts with one boundary at 182 days. In con-
trast, estimates in Figure 9 are for moving boundaries (the boundary coinciding with the
elapsed duration in the x-axis), and hence, moving cohorts. That is, Figure 9 represents
the differences of two hazard rates at the boundary t0, for t0 ∈ [123172].
The results in Figure 9 provide evidence of anticipatory behavior, showing a drop in
the hazard rates starting after the beginning of the 5th month. Despite the wide 95%
confidence intervals towards the end of the period (due to the bias corrections dis-
cussed above), the anticipatory effect is statistically significant during the second half of
month 5.3637 This evidence of anticipatory behavior is new, as previous NDYP results,
like ours in Table 4, did not consider changes in behavior closely before the moment of
enrollment.38
36Pointwise confidence intervals, not uniform.
37The anticipatory effect was not detected in our discrete-time analysis with a monthly time unit in Ta-
ble 4, although the signs of the estimates in column 1 of Table 4 are consistent with the results in Figure 9.
The lack of significance of the estimated anticipatory effect in the 5th month in Table 4 is due to time aggre-
gation: it conflates a zero effects in the first half of the 5th month with a negative effect in the second half,
hence diluting the overall effect over the month and making it more difficult to detect.
38Black, Smith, Berger, and Noel (2003) provided evidence that many unemployed workers in the US dis-
like being an unemployment insurance claimant if it involves mandatory participation in programs of job
search counselling. This does not seem to apply to the long-term young unemployed in the UK, approach-
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Figure 9. Nonparametric continuous-time estimates of the average effect of the arrival of in-
formation about future enrollment at 6 months on the hazard rate of leaving unemployment, by
elapsed unemployment duration between 123 and 172 days. Note: Dashed lines represent 95%
confidence intervals.
The empirical finding on the anticipation of future enrollment in job search assis-
tance has implications for standard evaluation approaches of participation in job search
assistance. It is likely that those who postpone job search until after the enrollment into
job search assistance at 6 months are on average more work-prone than those who re-
main unemployed for 6 months in a world without the program. In that case, a compari-
son of spells with elapsed durations of 6 months, before and after the introduction of the
program (and censoring any spells crossing the reform date), would lead to an upward
bias in the estimated effect of the job search assistance.
6. Conclusions
This paper merges regression discontinuity methods and duration analysis. We have
shown that, in order to study causal policy effects on hazard rates, one may usefully
exploit spells crossing the moment of the introduction of the policy, even if the in-
dividual hazard rates depend on unobserved covariates. The approach does not need
any functional form assumption on the hazard rate or its determinants. This stands
in marked contrast to standard duration analysis, which has been plagued by propor-
tionality assumptions on the hazard rate, functional form assumptions on the duration
ing eligibility to a job-search assistance program. Indeed, it is conceivable that this is the result of a dynamic
selection where those who find a job relatively fast anyway leave unemployment very fast, and hence are
underrepresented in the subpopulations over which our estimated ATS are defined.
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dependence and the unobserved heterogeneity distribution, and a “random effects” as-
sumption for observed and unobserved covariates. An additional advantage of the new
approach is that it enables policy evaluation shortly after the introduction of a new pol-
icy.
Our analysis shows that details of how a new policy for subjects in a certain state is
implemented have implications for the quality and timing of evaluation studies regard-
ing effects on the hazard rate out of the state. A reform that immediately applies to all
subjects in the state of interest alleviates the need for strong identifying assumptions
and supports the early production of evaluation results on the hazard rate. Conversely,
a reform that applies only to new entrants into the state of interest will have to deal with
differential dynamic selection and possibly with differential selection at inflow once the
new regime is announced; it will also require waiting for at least t periods before the
impact at duration t can be evaluated.
Our approach is also suitable to study the causal effect of the arrival of information
on the hazard rate in a certain state. If the information captures the future moment at
which the subject will be exposed to a certain treatment, then the approach provides
estimates of the anticipatory effect of the treatment without having to rule out unob-
served heterogeneity. In our empirical application, one of the effects we study concerns
the causal effect effect of receiving information at elapsed unemployment durations be-
low 6 months about an intensive job search assistance treatment at 6 months, on the
hazard rate of leaving unemployment. Using fully nonparametric inference allowing for
unobserved heterogeneity, we conclude that anticipatory effects on the hazard rate are
present in the weeks before the onset of the treatment. In those weeks, individuals re-
duce their search effort.
Our study provides some suggestions and implications for existing methods of policy
evaluation. First, consider semiparametric estimation of simple models for the observed
hazard rate (i.e., without unobserved heterogeneity) in which exposure to the new policy
is a time-varying covariate and in which the data include spells crossing the reform date.
Such simple models may be regarded as a representation of the distribution of observ-
ables that is generated by underlying individual hazard rates with unobserved hetero-
geneity. In our nonparametric approach, observed hazards are informative on average
policy effects on individual hazard rates in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity,
without any identified model structure. This leads to the insight that the estimated pol-
icy exposure coefficient in a simple model can be informative on the causal policy effect.
In this sense, estimates obtained under the assumption of no unobserved heterogeneity
are also informative without this assumption. This is an improvement over the conven-
tional state of affairs in hazard rate analysis.
Secondly, consider “dynamic matching” approaches for treatment evaluation. Recall
that these consider survivors at some elapsed duration t0 and, amongst them, compare
the treated at t0 to the not-yet-treated at t0, assuming conditional independence of the
treatment status at t0 from the potential outcomes after t0, conditional on covariates X .
Such approaches are silent on how this assumption depends on dynamic selection due
to unobserved heterogeneity in the interval between inflow and t0. Our analysis car-
ries the caveat that the assumption is unlikely to be satisfied if the treatment and com-
parison groups have had systematically different event histories between inflow and t0
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even if they have the same distribution of personal characteristics and labor market his-
tories at the time of inflow. To put this more constructively, we recommend that such
approaches verify that after propensity score matching, the comparison group is simi-
lar in terms of (i) the duration distribution between inflow and t0, and (ii) the distribu-
tion of observed characteristics X among survivors at t0. Effectively, satisfaction of these
conditions means that one matches on the distribution of unobservable characteristics
among survivors as well as on the propensity score.
Appendix A: Average multiplicative effects on individual hazard rates
A.1 Identification
By analogy to the proof of Proposition 2, it follows that
θT (t0|XS = t0)
θT (t0|XS = t1) =
E
[
θT (t0|XV S = t0)|XT ≥ t0 S = t0
]
E
[
θT (t0|XV S = t1)|XT ≥ t0 S = t1
]
= E
[
θT(t0)(t0|XV )|XT(t0)≥ t0
]
E
[
θT(t1)(t0|XV )|XT(t0)≥ t0
] (7)
with t1 > t0. Thus, the ratio of the observable average hazard rates equals the ratio of the
average counterfactual hazard rate (averaged over the same subpopulation). This does
not necessarily equal an average multiplicative effect (i.e. an average of the ratio). For
this, we make the additional assumption,
Assumption 3 (Multiplicative Unobserved Heterogeneity).
θT(s)(t|XV )= θ0T(s)(t|X)V  (8)
This imposes that the unobserved individual characteristics V affect the counter-
factual hazard rates in the same proportional way. Note that this is weaker than adopt-
ing an MPH model framework for T(s)|XV or T |XSV . First, it does not rule out
that t and X and the treatment status interact in the hazard rates of T(s)|XV or
T |XSV . And secondly, it does not make the MPH assumption that V ⊥ X . But it
does imply that individual treatment effects on the hazard at t can be expressed as
θ0T(s′)(t|X)/θ0T(s)(t|X), so they are homogeneous across individuals with different V (but
not necessarily across X or over time). Indeed, the individual effects at t equal the
average multiplicative effects on the hazard rate given X , as defined by versions of
ATTS(s′ s t|X) and ATNTS(s′ s t|X).
By substituting Assumption 3 into (7), we obtain that θT (t0|XS = t0)/θT (t0|X
S = t1) for t1 > t0 identifies the average multiplicative effects ATNTS(t0 t1 t0|X) and
thus ATTS(t0 t1 t0|X). In sum,
Proposition 3. Consider the introduction of a compulsory policy at a given point of
time. Suppose we have duration data from cohorts that flow in before this point of
time. Under Assumptions 1, 2, and 3, the multiplicative treatment effect on the indi-
vidual hazard rate at t0 given X is non-parametrically identified and equals θT (t0|X
S = t0)/θT (t0|XS = t1)with t1 > t0. This does not depend on t1 as long as t1 exceeds t0.
910 van den Berg, Bozio, and Costa Dias Quantitative Economics 11 (2020)
This result can be related to identification results for duration models with unob-
served heterogeneity and time-varying explanatory variables. Honoré (1991) considers
an MPH model with a time-varying explanatory variable that is equal across individuals
at short durations but different for some individuals at high durations (notice that our
variable S can be re-expressed like that if we only use one value t1 > t0). He shows that the
MPH model is fully identified without assumptions on the tail of the distribution of V .
He identifies the effect of the time-varying covariate on the individual hazard rate by
considering the ratio of the observable hazard rates at points in time where the covari-
ate value changes for a subset of individuals. Clearly, this resembles the approach in the
proof of Proposition 3. Brinch (2007) considers a hazard rate model where X is absent
and S is replaced by a time-varying explanatory variable x˜(t) that is different across in-
dividuals at short durations but equal for some individuals at high durations. His model
is more general than an MPH model because t and x˜(t) may interact in the individual
hazard rate, like in our Assumption 3. However, it does not allow for covariates X that
are dependent on V , and it requires a monotonicity assumption on the overall effect of
the past path of x˜(t) on the observed survival probability, which we do not need. Brinch
(2007) shows that his model is fully identified. His proof is a mirror-image of the proof
of Proposition 3: he exploits variation in the value of x˜(t) at short durations in order to
gather information on the unobserved heterogeneity distribution, whereas we exploit
the lack of variation in the dynamic selection up to t0 in order to gather information on
the causal effect of S.
A.2 Inference
We start out by pointing out that if Assumption 3 applies, T |XS has a survival function
that is a Laplace transform of a monotone function of the duration variable. We do not
exploit this restriction in the estimation procedure.
We are interested in estimating the ratio of two hazard rates, based on different in-
dependent samples, and each evaluated at the left boundary. In obvious notation, we
denote this ratio by
r(0)= θ1(0)
θ2(0)
and we denote its estimator by r˜(0) := θ˜1(0)/θ˜2(0), where θ˜i(0) is the boundary kernel
hazard estimator of Section 3 (or, alternatively, a local linear hazard rate estimator). We
may distinguish between three different methods to obtain a confidence interval for
r(0). All three of these methods are more generally applicable to ratio estimators. First,
we may perform bootstrapping simultaneously on both samples. Secondly, we may ap-
ply the delta method. If, following Tu (2007), we again ignore the asymptotic biases, then
we obtain that the estimator r˜(0) has an asymptotically normal distribution with mean
r(0) and variance
AVar
(
θ˜1(0)
)+ r2(0)AVar(θ˜2(0))
θ22(0)

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For this, we need to assume that, in obvious notation, the fraction n1b1n/(n2b2n) con-
verges to a finite number. The confidence interval follows immediately (see Müller et al.
(2004), which also contains an empirical example in the related case of boundary kernel
estimation of a ratio of densities). Also, a local bandwidth may be used. The approach
can be straightforwardly extended to allow for asymptotic biases (see, e.g., Porter (2003),
for the relevant delta method result).
The third approach is to use Fieller-type confidence intervals (see Tu (2007)). The
basic idea is to make a confidence interval for θ˜1(0)− r(0)θ˜2(0) and to convert this into a
confidence interval for r˜(0). This again requires that n1b1n/(n2b2n) converges to a finite
number.
Appendix B: Algorithm for the data-adaptive boundary kernel estimator
with local bandwidths
Müller and Wang’s (1994) optimal local bandwidths minimize the asymptotic mean
squared error (MSE). However, this objective function is impractical since it depends
on unknown quantities, like the hazard rates themselves. Instead, the optimal local
bandwidths can be consistently estimated by minimizing an estimate of the local mean
squared error (see Müller and Wang (1990, 1994) for a discussion). The following algo-
rithm details the computational implementation stages of the local data-adaptive kernel
hazard estimator:
Step 1. Choose initial value of bandwidth and construct grids:
1. The initial value of the bandwidth, b0, is to be used as global bandwidth to start off
the estimation. Müller and Wang (1994) propose b0 =R/(8n1/5u ) if data is available in the
time interval [0R], where nu is the number of uncensored observations.
2. Construct an equidistant grid for duration variable T in the domain A= [0R], call
it T˜ = {˜t1     t˜M}. Computation time depends crucially on the size of this grid, so one
may start with a parsimonious choice of M .
3. If computation time is important and, as a consequence, T˜ is sparse, construct a
second, finer, equidistant grid for duration variable T in the domain A = [0R] to esti-
mate the hazard functions. Call it T˜ = {˜t1     t˜P}, where P >M .
4. Construct an equidistant grid for bandwidth b in [bb]; call it B˜ = {b˜1     b˜L}.
Müller and Wang (1994) propose using b = 2b0/3 and b = 4b0. In the empirical analy-
sis in Section 5, this interval is too tight as the optimal choice often coincides with its
boundaries. Therefore, we use [bb] = [b0/66b0].
Step 2. Obtain an initial estimate of the hazard rates in all points of the grid T˜ using
the initial global bandwidth b0:
θ̂0(˜tp) = 1
b0
n∑
i=1
K˜tp
(
t˜p − t(i)
b0
)
δ(i)
n− i+ 1
for p= 1    P .
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Step 3. For each point t˜m ∈ T˜ (m= 1    M), estimate the optimal local bandwidth by
minimizing the local MSE:
1. Compute the MSE at t˜m for each bandwidth b˜l ∈ B˜ (l = 1    L). This is
MSE(˜tm b˜l) = Var(˜tm b˜l)+ bias2(˜tm b˜l)
where the Var(˜tm b˜l) and bias(˜tm b˜l) are, respectively, the asymptotic variance and bias
of the hazard estimator at duration t˜m when using bandwidth b˜l. The following are con-
sistent estimators of these two quantities:
V̂ar(˜tm b˜l) = 1
nb˜l
∫ R
0
K2t˜m
(
t˜m − t
b˜l
)
θ̂0(t)
Fn(t)
dt
b̂ias(˜tm b˜l) =
∫ R
0
Kt˜m
(
t˜m − t
b˜l
)
θ̂0(t)dt − θ̂0(˜tm)
where the function F is the empirical survival function of the uncensored observations.
F can be estimated at each grid point t˜p as follows:
F(˜tp) = 1− 1
n+ 1
n∑
i=1
1(ti ≤ t˜p δi = 1)
The integrals can be approximated numerically. For a generic function g(t), a simple
numerical approximation over a grid T˜ including the lower and upper boundaries of the
integrating interval (in this case 0 and R) is
∫ R
0
g(t)dt  R
P − 1
{
P−1∑
p=2
g(˜tp)+ g(˜t1)+ g(˜tP)2
}

An alternative is to estimate the variance and bias by varying t (the integrating vari-
able) over the observations instead of over the grid.
2. Select the bandwidth that minimizes the estimated MSE at point t˜m over the
grid B˜:
b∗(˜tm) = argmin
b˜l
{
M̂SE(˜tm b˜l) b˜l ∈ B˜
}

Step 4. Smooth the bandwidths b∗ to obtain the bandwidths b̂ over the grid on which
the hazard rates are to be estimated, T˜ . The optimal data-adaptive local bandwidths
(using the initial bandwidth b0 to smooth the original estimates) are
b̂(˜tp) =
[
M∑
m=1
K˜tp
(
t˜p − t˜m
b0
)]−1 M∑
m=1
K˜tp
(
t˜p − t˜m
b0
)
b∗(˜tm)
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Step 5. Estimate the data-adaptive kernel hazard rates for points in T˜ using the band-
widths b̂(˜tp) for p= 1    P
θ̂(˜tp) = 1
b̂(˜tp)
n∑
i=1
K˜tp
(
t˜p − t(i)
b̂(˜tp)
)
δ(i)
n− i+ 1 
See also Hess, Serachitopol, and Brown (1999) for useful details on the implementa-
tion of the estimator.
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